Your Own Database and End-to-End Encryption: Why Both Matter
A database your firm owns decides where pentest data lives; end-to-end encryption decides who can read it there. What each one protects, and why both.
Keeping pentest data in a database your firm owns and encrypting it end to end sound like the same promise. They are not. The first decides where the data lives and who holds it; the second decides what that data is while it is there. Each closes a gap the other leaves open, which is why a testing firm wants both.
What a database of your own settles
With a database of your own, the platform runs the software and your firm holds the data, in its own cloud account or on its own server, in a region it chose. That settles questions a platform keeping every customer in one database cannot:
- Residency. The region in your data processing agreement is the one you picked.
- A vendor breach. The vendor holds no copy of your clients’ findings, so a compromise of its systems does not reach them.
- Other customers. No table holds another firm’s rows next to yours, so there is no tenant filter to get wrong.
- Leaving. The data is already yours, so there is nothing to ask for back.
Setting one up is a guided step rather than a project, and creating your database walks through it. The trade-offs of running the whole platform yourself instead are in self-hosted or cloud pentest reporting.
What it leaves open
A database you own is still a database somebody administers. Everything in it can be read by:
- anyone with an administrator role on your cloud account or the server;
- the hosting provider’s own staff, within whatever access they keep;
- a backup, a snapshot or a dump, wherever it is copied to;
- whoever finds a leaked connection string or database password.
Encryption at rest does not shorten that list, because the database server holds the key and decrypts for whoever it lets in.
What end-to-end encryption settles
End-to-end encryption takes the key out of the database. The testing work is encrypted in the browser before it is sent, so the database only ever stores ciphertext, and the keys are held by the people allowed to read it, on their own devices. Everyone on the list above now gets ciphertext. End-to-end encryption for pentest findings, explained goes through what it covers and where it stops.
What it leaves open on its own
Encryption on its own does not say where the data lives. A platform could encrypt end to end and still keep every customer’s ciphertext together, in one database in a region it chose, with its own backups of it, and leaving would still mean asking for your data back.
Ciphertext is also not the only thing a database holds. The names, dates and statuses that let a platform schedule and count the work stay readable, so where that database lives, and who can reach it, still matters. A client list with engagement dates is itself information a firm would rather keep to itself.
The two together
| Risk | A database of your own | End-to-end encryption |
|---|---|---|
| The vendor is breached | No copy to take | No key to take |
| A copy of your database leaks | Everything in it readable | The work is ciphertext |
| An administrator of your cloud or host | Can read everything | Sees ciphertext |
| Residency and leaving | Your region, and already yours | Not addressed |
Each row has a column that answers it, and no single column answers them all. A firm with both can give short, mechanical answers to the questions in a client’s security questionnaire that are usually the hardest.
Where each one shows up in a questionnaire
A client’s supplier questionnaire asks about both, usually in different sections, and it helps to know which promise answers which row before the reviewer asks.
- Data residency. Answered by the database: the region it was created in, in your own account, and nowhere else.
- Backups and retention. Answered by the database, because the backups are yours and kept on your schedule, and by the encryption, because each of those backups holds the work as ciphertext.
- Encryption at rest and in transit. Answered by both, and end-to-end encryption goes further than either, because the work is ciphertext before it reaches the database at all.
- Who can access client data. Answered by the encryption: the people your firm allows, on their own devices, and nobody whose only access is to a server.
- A breach of the vendor. Answered by both: no copy of the work to take, and no key that would open one.
Answers that point at a mechanism rather than a policy are the ones that survive a technical reviewer’s second question, and they are shorter to write.
Questions to ask
- Whose account is the database in, and in which region? Yours, in a region you chose, is the answer you want.
- Does the vendor keep any copy, replica or backup of it? If it does, that copy is the vendor’s to lose.
- Is the work encrypted before it leaves the browser, and who holds the keys? Your people, on their own devices.
- What stays readable in the database, and why? A precise list beats a reassuring adjective.
- What does setting it up ask of your team? If the answer is a key ceremony, expect it to be skipped.
Pental’s Portal does both. Each firm’s data lives in a database the firm owns: PostgreSQL in its own cloud, on a server of its own or on Supabase Cloud, with no copy kept by Pental. Inside it, findings, evidence, files, notes, comments and the credentials clients send are encrypted in the browser before they are saved, so that database holds them only as ciphertext. The keys are kept there only wrapped: for your people’s browsers and passwords, and, for a first sign-in or a forgotten password, under two locks, the database’s own and Pental’s, that neither opens alone. It is on for every firm, with nothing to set up. See how the end-to-end encryption works.
Common Questions
- Is a database of your own the same as end-to-end encryption?
- No. A database of your own decides where the data lives and who holds it. End-to-end encryption decides what the data is while it is there: ciphertext, with the keys held by the people allowed to read it. The first protects you from the vendor; the second also protects you from whoever can reach the database.
- If our data is in our own database, why encrypt it end to end?
- Because a database you own is still readable by its administrators, its hosting provider, its backups and anyone who finds its password. End-to-end encryption means each of those sees ciphertext, while your own people read the work as normal in their browsers.
- Does end-to-end encryption make a pentest platform harder to use?
- It should not. Keys can be made and passed between a person’s devices without anyone handling them, so nobody sets up or keeps a key, and the portal, reports and integrations work as before.
- What should still be readable in the database?
- What the platform needs to schedule and count the work without opening it: client and engagement names, dates, statuses and severities. The words of the work, the evidence and the files are what an attacker wants, and those are what should be encrypted.
Keep Reading
End-to-End Encryption for Pentest Findings, Explained
What end-to-end encryption means for pentest findings, how it differs from encryption at rest, what it protects, and what to ask a platform about it.
Pentest Reporting for Government Work: What Each Country Allows
Can a pentest firm keep government findings in a reporting platform? What the UK, US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the EU ask, and how Pental fits.
Growing a Pentest Consultancy Past Ten Testers: What Breaks
What breaks when a pentest consultancy grows past ten testers: review, scheduling, house style, templates and overflow, and what to put in place first.
Setup guide
See the product set up, end to end
The whole setup in 5:44, with chapters you can jump to: your firm's name, your own domain, your own database in any of three places, email from your own address, branding, updating the database on Supabase Cloud, and moving the database if you change your mind.
- 0:00 · Your name and your firm’s name
- 0:15 · Custom domain
- 0:43 · Your own database, three ways
- +4 more