In Pental’s Portal each firm owns its data, in a database of its own, which Pental has no access to. The testing work in it is also end-to-end encrypted, so read straight from the database, it is unreadable: findings, evidence, files and the credentials clients send are encrypted in the browser of whoever writes them, and opened only in the browsers of the people allowed to read them. Nobody sets anything up.
The first layer is where the data is kept. Each firm’s data is in a Postgres database the firm owns, in its own account and region, and Pental keeps no copy of it and has no way in. How your own database works.
The second is what that data is while it is there. Encryption at rest protects a stolen disk, but the server that holds the data holds the key to it as well. End-to-end encryption takes the key away from the server: the testing work is encrypted in the browser before it is sent, and opened only in your people’s browsers. A dump of your database, a backup of it, or anyone reading it, gets ciphertext.
Everything that says what was found, and how, is encrypted. What runs the firm around it stays readable, so the parts of the portal that count, bill and schedule keep working.
Client and engagement names, dates, statuses, severities and scores stay readable, as do your people and their roles, so the calendar, counts, dashboards and automation all work. Each engagement carries a badge saying it is end-to-end encrypted.
Each client has a key and the firm has one, and an engagement’s work is under its client’s. The database keeps every key only wrapped: sealed separately for each browser and each sign-in that may open it, so nothing it holds opens anything by itself.
Every browser a person signs in on makes a key of its own, which it can use but never hand out. A new browser is opened as the person signs in, by their password.
For the times a person has nothing of their own to open their work with, a first sign-in, a forgotten password, a browser that has lost its key, your database keeps each person a recovery key under two locks. The browser that makes it seals it to a key of Pental’s before your database is handed it, and your database seals that again under its own Vault. Your database gives it only to its own person, signed in with their second factor proved, and Pental’s server opens its half only for a ticket your database made for that sign-in. Neither opens it alone: your database has only what Pental sealed, and Pental is sent no data and no session.
Who may open which key is your database’s rule, beside the rest of its access rules: your administrators, seniors and testers every key, an external tester the keys of the clients they work on, and a client’s own people their own organisation’s. Someone who leaves, or whose role changes, keeps no key they are no longer allowed.
Nothing invented here: the browser’s built-in Web Crypto for every cipher, and Argon2id for stretching a password.
That the testing work is encrypted on the device of whoever writes it and opened only on the devices of the people allowed to read it. The servers in between, and the database that keeps it, hold ciphertext, and nothing they hold opens it by itself. In Pental’s Portal that covers findings, evidence, files, notes, comments and the credentials clients send.
No. It is on from your first sign-in. Nobody is asked to make, write down or keep a key: each browser makes its own, and a person’s password opens their work on a new one.
Their work is not lost with it: their password opens it on their next browser. Remove the lost browser on their profile, or under Settings, Security, and it is given no keys again, and sign its sessions out there too. If the password is forgotten too, it is reset from the sign-in page, and the work opens with the new one.
Yes, in their own portal. A client’s people are given their own organisation’s key and no other, so they read their engagements and nobody else’s. Their first sign-in opens it with nobody else online, and after that their password does.
Yes. An authenticator app and a passkey are both second factors and neither holds a key: the password a person signs in with opens their keys on a new browser, so either choice works with nothing extra to do.
They reset it from the sign-in page like any other, sign in with the new one and their second factor, and their work opens, on any browser and with nobody else online. A recovery key your database keeps for each person does it. It is under two locks, your database’s and Pental’s, so neither opens it alone.
Yes. Tracker tickets, emails, AI drafting, SharePoint and Google Drive copies and password managers are handed the words they need by the browser that sends them, as they are sent. An API key made in the Portal opens what its person may read, and the API guide gives the steps a script follows.
Start a free trial: your portal is end-to-end encrypted from the moment it is live, on a database your firm owns.