Cloud Storage Bucket Publicly Accessible

A Cloud Storage bucket grants access to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers, so anyone on the internet, or anyone with any Google account, can read and sometimes list its objects.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
OWASP Top 10A01:2025 Broken Access Control
MITRE ATT&CKT1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

Access to Cloud Storage buckets and objects is granted through IAM policies and, on buckets that still use fine-grained access control, through access control lists (ACLs). Two special principals make data public: allUsers means anyone on the internet, and allAuthenticatedUsers means anyone signed in to any Google account, not only users in the organisation. A bucket is publicly accessible when either principal is granted a role on it, such as Storage Object Viewer, or when its objects carry ACL entries granting either principal read access.

An unauthenticated attacker can then download every object in the bucket, and list its contents where listing is granted, without any identity of their own being involved. Bucket names share a global namespace and often follow the organisation's or project's name, so they can be guessed, and tools such as GCPBucketBrute enumerate them. Public buckets commonly expose backups, exports, logs and configuration files, and configuration files often contain credentials, such as service account keys, that give further access to the project. The impact depends on the data: a bucket of intentionally public website assets matters little, while one holding personal data may also amount to a reportable breach.

Public write access is less common but more serious: a role that lets allUsers create or overwrite objects allows anyone to plant or replace content, such as malware or altered website files.

The weakness is confirmed by requesting the bucket and its objects without credentials at https://storage.googleapis.com/ followed by the bucket name: where the grant includes listing, the response is an XML index of every object. Google Cloud's own security findings and cloud posture tools report public buckets.

Remediation

  • Remove every allUsers and allAuthenticatedUsers binding from the bucket's IAM policy, and grant access instead to specific users, groups or service accounts.
  • Enforce public access prevention on the bucket, which blocks any public grant through IAM or ACLs, and enforce it across the organisation or folder with the constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention organisation policy constraint.
  • Enable uniform bucket-level access, so that object ACLs cannot grant access that the bucket's IAM policy does not show.
  • Where content genuinely must be public, keep it in a dedicated bucket that holds nothing else, or give recipients time-limited signed URLs.
  • Treat anything that was exposed as disclosed, and rotate any credentials found in the bucket.
gcloud storage buckets remove-iam-policy-binding "gs://$BUCKET" --member=allUsers --role=roles/storage.objectViewer gcloud storage buckets update "gs://$BUCKET" --public-access-prevention

Confirm the fix by repeating the unauthenticated listing and download requests and confirming that they are refused.

References


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