Dangerous Access Control Entries on Directory Objects
Low-privileged users or groups hold rights over directory objects, such as full control, permission changes or password resets, that let them take over privileged accounts.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource |
| OWASP Top 10 | A01:2025 Broken Access Control |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1098 Account Manipulation, T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain Groups, T1484.001 Group Policy Modification |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
Every Active Directory object has a security descriptor whose access control entries (ACEs) decide who can read and change it. Some rights give control of the object, or of what it governs, to whoever holds them: GenericAll (full control), WriteDacl (change permissions), WriteOwner (take ownership), GenericWrite or write access to sensitive attributes, the Reset Password extended right, and the right to change a group's members. Ownership of an object also carries the right to change its permissions.
The finding arises when such rights are held by principals that should not have them, particularly broad groups such as Domain Users, Authenticated Users or Everyone, or ordinary user, service and computer accounts, on objects that lead to privilege: privileged users and groups, the domain object, AdminSDHolder, Group Policy objects linked to sensitive organisational units, and organisational units holding servers or administrators. Such entries usually build up over years: service desk rights granted at the domain root, applications that add rights at installation, owners left from objects created by ordinary accounts, and rights granted through nested groups that are hard to see in the standard consoles.
An attacker who controls an account holding these rights can use them directly: reset a privileged user's password, add an account to a privileged group, write a service principal name to a user and Kerberoast it, add a key credential to its msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute and authenticate as it (shadow credentials, where the domain supports key trust), edit a Group Policy object to run code on the computers it applies to, or grant further rights, including directory replication rights at the domain root. Where a path leads to Domain Admins or an equivalent, this means full control of the domain; the impact is lower where paths only reach unprivileged objects. Because these are legitimate permissions, their use looks like ordinary administration and may go unnoticed.
Graph tools such as BloodHound, and assessment tools such as PingCastle, read the security descriptors, which any domain user can normally read, and show the attack paths they create, such as a chain of rights from ordinary users to Domain Admins.
Remediation
- Remove each dangerous ACE that the attack paths rely on, starting with those held by broad groups and those on the domain object,
AdminSDHolder, privileged groups and Group Policy objects, using the Advanced Security Settings in Active Directory Users and Computers ordsacls. Record the business need for any right that must stay. - Make an administrative group the owner of privileged objects, Group Policy objects and organisational units where the owner is an ordinary account.
- Redesign delegation so that operational rights, such as password resets for the service desk, are granted to dedicated groups on the organisational units that hold ordinary users and computers, and never at the domain root or over Tier 0 objects.
- Make changes for protected accounts and groups on
AdminSDHolder: its permissions are copied to them every 60 minutes by default, overwriting edits made directly on those objects. - Audit changes to the security descriptors of sensitive objects (Audit Directory Service Changes, event 5136) and alert on them.
As an interim measure, where a right cannot be removed at once, reduce the membership of the group that holds it and monitor the objects concerned. Confirm the fix by repeating the BloodHound or PingCastle analysis and checking that no ordinary principal still has a path to privileged objects, and repeat the analysis periodically.
References
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/implementing-least-privilege-administrative-models
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegation-control-wizard
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