Exported Android Components Without Protection

Android activities, services or broadcast receivers are exported without a permission, so any other app on the device can start or call them.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.04.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-926: Improper Export of Android Application Components
OWASP Top 10A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

Android app components (activities, services, broadcast receivers and content providers) can be exported, which lets other apps start or call them. A component is exported when android:exported="true" is set in the manifest or, for apps targeting versions before Android 12 (API level 31), implicitly when it declares an intent filter. Apps targeting Android 12 or higher must set the attribute explicitly on components with intent filters. Content providers are covered by a separate finding.

The weakness arises when an exported component that performs a sensitive action or returns data is not protected by a permission, ideally one with the signature protection level, and does not validate the intents it receives. Typical examples are internal activities that skip the login screen, services that act on the user's behalf, and receivers that trust broadcast data. A malicious app on the same device needs no special permission to invoke such a component and, depending on what the component does, may open screens that should require authentication, trigger actions such as payments or account changes without the user's intent, read data the component returns, or crash the app. The attack requires the user to install the malicious app, which limits the likelihood but is realistic for widely used apps.

Intent redirection, where an exported component forwards an intent it received to an internal component, extends the problem to components that are not exported themselves. Testing lists exported components from the decoded manifest, with tools such as apktool, jadx or drozer, and sends crafted intents to them, for example with adb shell am start or adb shell am broadcast, to observe their behaviour.

Remediation

  • Set android:exported="false" on every component that other apps do not need to use.
  • Protect components that must be exported, such as those shared between apps from the same developer, with a custom permission declared with android:protectionLevel="signature".
  • Treat every incoming intent as untrusted input: validate its action, data and extras, check that the user is authenticated before performing sensitive actions, and do not forward received intents to other components without checking them.
  • Use explicit intents for communication within the app, and make PendingIntent objects immutable with FLAG_IMMUTABLE where they are handed to other apps.
<permission android:name="com.example.app.permission.INTERNAL" android:protectionLevel="signature" /> <activity android:name=".AccountActivity" android:exported="true" android:permission="com.example.app.permission.INTERNAL" />

Confirm the fix by repeating the intent tests from adb or a separate test app and checking that protected components refuse them.

References


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