Firmware Settings Not Protected
The UEFI or BIOS setup has no administrator password, so anyone with physical access can change the boot order and turn off firmware security features.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1542 Pre-OS Boot, T1200 Hardware Additions |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
The firmware setup interface (UEFI or BIOS) is not protected by an administrator or supervisor password, so anyone at the keyboard can enter it during start-up and change its settings. With access to setup, a person can turn off Secure Boot, the TPM, virtualisation support and other security features the vendor provides, and can enable booting from USB devices or the network and change the boot order, so that an attacker with physical access can boot the device from their own media. Related weaknesses are a one-time boot menu that allows external boot devices without a password, and a single firmware password used across the whole estate and widely known among staff.
Where the disk is not encrypted, booting from the attacker's media gives them full read and write access to its contents and to the operating system. Where disk encryption is in place, booting another operating system does not unlock the disk, and turning off Secure Boot normally causes BitLocker to require its recovery key, so the main risk becomes the quiet weakening of platform protections as one step in a longer attack. The risk is therefore greatest when combined with missing disk encryption or pre-boot authentication.
The weakness is identified during a build review by restarting the device and entering firmware setup or the boot menu, or with the vendor's management tools, which report whether an administrator password is set.
Remediation
- Set a firmware administrator (supervisor) password on all devices, applying it at scale with the vendor's management tools, and store the passwords in a password vault with access limited to the support staff who need them.
- Use a unique password for each device, or at least for each group of devices, so that one disclosed password does not unlock the whole estate.
- Disable booting from external media and the network unless required, put the internal disk first in the boot order, and protect the one-time boot menu with the same password.
- Enable Secure Boot and the TPM, and turn on any firmware write protection the vendor offers.
- Keep firmware up to date through the vendor's update process.
As an interim measure, make sure the affected devices have full disk encryption with pre-boot authentication. Confirm the fix by restarting a sample of devices and checking that firmware setup and the boot menu require the password.
References
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