HTTP Request Smuggling
A front-end server and the back end behind it disagree about where each HTTP request ends, so an attacker can hide a request inside another and interfere with other users' requests.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 9.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie |
| Category | Input Validation |
Description
Most web applications sit behind a front-end server, such as a load balancer, reverse proxy or content delivery network, that forwards requests to back-end servers over shared, reused connections. HTTP/1.1 offers two ways to mark the end of a request body, the Content-Length header and chunked Transfer-Encoding. When the front end and back end interpret an ambiguous request differently, for example one honouring Content-Length and the other Transfer-Encoding (the CL.TE and TE.CL variants), or one accepting an obfuscated header that the other ignores, part of the attacker's request is left on the back-end connection and treated as the start of the next request, which may belong to another user. The same problem arises when a front end that speaks HTTP/2 to clients rewrites requests into HTTP/1.1 for the back end.
By smuggling requests in this way, an attacker can bypass access controls that are enforced only by the front end, such as restrictions on administrative paths, capture other users' requests, including their session cookies and submitted data, deliver reflected cross-site scripting or redirects to other users without any interaction, and poison caches. Exploitation does not need authentication, but success against other users depends on timing and traffic beyond the attacker's control, and attempts can disrupt the service for legitimate users.
The weakness typically shows itself on a test through timing differences and through responses to a follow-up request that change, found with tools such as Burp Suite's scanner and its HTTP Request Smuggler extension. Testing needs care, because a successful probe can alter the responses that real users receive.
Remediation
Make every server in the chain interpret requests the same way, and reject those that are ambiguous:
- Use HTTP/2 end to end where possible, so that requests are not rewritten into HTTP/1.1 between the front end and the back end.
- Configure the front end to normalise ambiguous requests and to reject requests that contain both
Content-LengthandTransfer-Encoding, multiple or invalidContent-Lengthvalues, or malformed or obfuscatedTransfer-Encodingheaders. - Make the back end reject the same ambiguous requests, or process them by
Transfer-Encodingalone and close the connection afterwards, as HTTP/1.1 requires. - Keep load balancers, proxies, content delivery configuration and web servers up to date, as many smuggling flaws are in their request parsing.
- Where a full fix will take time, disable reuse of back-end connections, at some cost to performance.
Confirm the fix by repeating the original tests and checking that ambiguous requests are rejected and follow-up requests are unaffected.
References
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