Insecure Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) Policy
The application's CORS policy lets untrusted origins read its responses with the user's credentials, so a malicious site can read a logged-in user's data.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains |
| OWASP Top 10 | A02:2025 Security Misconfiguration |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) lets a server relax the browser's same-origin policy for chosen origins through response headers. The application's policy trusts origins it should not: it reflects any value of the request's Origin header in Access-Control-Allow-Origin, accepts the null origin, or validates origins with a pattern that matches unintended domains, such as a check that the origin merely ends with or contains the organisation's domain, or a regular expression with an unescaped dot. Where it also returns Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, script on a trusted origin can make requests that carry the user's cookies and read the responses.
When a logged-in user visits a page controlled by the attacker, the page can then read any response that the affected endpoints return to that user, such as personal data, account details, API keys and anti-CSRF tokens, and can use those tokens to perform further actions in the user's name. Exploitation needs the browser to send the session cookie with the cross-site request, which current defaults restrict unless the cookie is set with SameSite=None or the attacker controls a page on a trusted or same-site origin. Where only a trusted subdomain can exploit the policy, the attacker first needs a cross-site scripting flaw on, or takeover of, that subdomain.
The weakness typically shows itself on a test when a request with an arbitrary or crafted Origin header receives a response that echoes it with credentials allowed. Burp Suite reports trust of arbitrary origins, unencrypted origins and all subdomains as separate CORS issues. A wildcard on its own is not usually exploitable for authenticated data, because browsers refuse to combine it with credentials, but it matters where a response is protected only by network location.
Remediation
Grant cross-origin access only to origins that are trusted, and only where it is needed:
- Compare the
Originheader with an exact list of trusted origins, including scheme, host and port, and return it inAccess-Control-Allow-Originonly on a match. Never reflect arbitrary values, trustnull, or match origins by prefix, suffix or loose pattern. - Return
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueonly on endpoints that genuinely need credentialed cross-origin access, and only to trusted origins. - Do not trust
httporigins for an application served over HTTPS. - Add
Vary: Originto responses whose CORS headers depend on the request's origin, so that caches do not serve one origin's response to another. - Apply CORS headers only to the routes that need them rather than to the whole application, and set
SameSite=LaxorStricton session cookies.
Confirm the fix by sending requests with arbitrary, null, look-alike and subdomain origins and checking that none is reflected with credentials allowed.
References
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