Insecure JSONP Endpoint
An endpoint returns data as JSONP, a script any website can load, so other sites may read data meant for the logged-in user or inject script through the callback name.
| Severity | Low |
| CVSS 3.1 | 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 2.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-346: Origin Validation Error |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| Category | Information Disclosure |
Description
JSONP (JSON with padding) is a legacy technique for sharing data across origins that predates CORS. The endpoint wraps its JSON response in a call to a function named by a request parameter, commonly callback or jsonp, and returns it as JavaScript. Because browsers let a page load and run a script from any origin, any website can include the endpoint with a <script> element and receive the data in its own function, and the same-origin policy, which normally stops one site reading another's responses, does not apply.
Two problems follow. Where the endpoint returns data specific to the user and identifies them by cookie, a site the user visits may be able to read that data, a form of cross-site script inclusion: an attacker who lures a logged-in user to their website can read whatever the endpoint returns for that user, such as personal details, account data or anti-CSRF tokens, without the user noticing. Current browsers limit this, and with their defaults such theft of authenticated data is often blocked: Chromium-based browsers do not send cookies that lack a SameSite attribute, or are marked Lax or Strict, with such requests, and other browsers block or partition third-party cookies. The exposure therefore mainly arises where session cookies are marked SameSite=None or the endpoint trusts network location rather than a login, and its impact depends on the sensitivity of the returned data.
Separately, where the callback name is not restricted, an attacker controls the start of a script served from the application's origin. This can be used to bypass a Content Security Policy that trusts that origin, defeating a policy that would otherwise contain an injection flaw elsewhere, and can lead to cross-site scripting if the response is served as HTML.
The issue is identified by adding a callback parameter to JSON endpoints, observing whether the response is wrapped, and checking which characters the callback accepts.
Remediation
- Retire JSONP. Serve data as JSON with the
application/jsoncontent type and, where another origin genuinely needs it, allow that origin explicitly with CORS rather than allowing every site. - Until the endpoint can be removed, do not return user-specific or sensitive data through it, and disable the callback parameter on every endpoint that does not need it, including framework defaults.
- Restrict the callback name to a short allowlist of known function names, or at minimum to letters, digits, underscores and dots, and reject anything else.
- Serve JSONP responses with a JavaScript content type and
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, never as HTML. - Reject cross-site requests for authenticated data by checking the
Sec-Fetch-Siterequest header (a resource isolation policy), and set session cookies toSameSite=LaxorStrictunless cross-site use is required.
Confirm the fix by requesting the endpoint with a callback parameter and checking that a JSON response, not a script, is returned.
References
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