Kubernetes Dashboard Exposed
The Kubernetes Dashboard is reachable from an untrusted network, where it may allow cluster management without credentials or through an over-privileged account.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1133 External Remote Services, T1610 Deploy Container |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
The Kubernetes Dashboard is an optional web interface for managing a cluster. It acts on the cluster with the credentials that users sign in with or, where its login can be skipped, with the permissions of its own service account. Many installation guides grant that service account broad rights, sometimes cluster-admin, so that the Dashboard works without a token.
The weakness arises when the Dashboard is published beyond the administrators who need it, through a LoadBalancer or NodePort Service, an Ingress, or kubectl proxy bound to a public interface. It is most serious when the skip option is enabled (--enable-skip-login), when the Dashboard's service account is privileged, or in versions before 1.10.1, which allowed authentication to be bypassed (CVE-2018-18264).
Where the Dashboard can be used without credentials, an attacker can do whatever its service account permits, which can include viewing workloads, logs and configuration, reading Secrets and, where the account is privileged, deploying containers and taking control of the cluster. An exposed Dashboard was the starting point of well-publicised compromises in which attackers ran cryptocurrency miners in cloud Kubernetes clusters. Where a token is required, the exposure still gives an attacker on an untrusted network a route to a powerful administrative interface, which leaked tokens or a future vulnerability in the Dashboard could open.
The exposure can be identified from the Dashboard's login page or interface on an exposed address, from the Services and Ingresses in its namespace, and by testing whether the interface can be used without signing in and what its service account is allowed to do.
Remediation
- Remove the Dashboard and, where a web interface is still needed, move to a maintained alternative such as Headlamp. The Dashboard project has been archived and will receive no further updates or security fixes.
- Do not publish it through public LoadBalancer or NodePort Services or Ingresses. Reach it through
kubectl port-forwardorkubectl proxyon the administrator's own machine, or behind an authenticating proxy with multi-factor authentication on an internal network. - Disable the skip option and require users to sign in with their own identity rather than a shared token, so that their own RBAC permissions apply.
- Reduce the Dashboard's own service account to the minimum permissions it needs, and remove any
cluster-adminbinding to it. - If the Dashboard has been usable without authentication, review the cluster for unknown workloads and rotate the Secrets it could read.
Confirm the fix by checking from an untrusted network that the Dashboard is no longer reachable, and from inside the network that it cannot be used without signing in.
References
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