Multi-Factor Authentication Bypass
The second authentication factor can be skipped, guessed or defeated, so an attacker who knows a user's password can sign in without it.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-304: Missing Critical Step in Authentication |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access, T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
The application asks for a second factor but does not enforce it reliably. The flaw lies in how the application implements the step, not in the factor itself, and it means that an attacker who obtains a user's password, by phishing, reuse from another breach or guessing, can complete sign-in without a valid second factor, so the account is in practice protected by the password alone. Because MFA is usually applied to the accounts and systems the organisation considers most valuable, such as administrators, remote access and financial functions, the accounts exposed are often high-value. The organisation may also be relying on MFA as a compensating control elsewhere, so the bypass can undermine defences it believes are in place.
Common variants met on tests include: the session issued after the password step already grants access to authenticated pages or API endpoints, so the MFA page can simply be skipped; the outcome of the check is decided by something the client controls, such as a response value that can be changed from false to true; one-time codes that can be brute-forced because attempts are not limited, or that stay valid for long periods or can be reused; codes that are not bound to the account, so a valid code from the attacker's own account is accepted; codes returned in a response or written to logs; other sign-in routes, such as an API, mobile endpoint or remember-device token, that skip the factor; and recovery or reset functions that remove MFA after weak checks.
Each is confirmed by signing in to a test account with its password and attempting the bypass, recording the requests that grant access without a valid second factor.
Remediation
- Track authentication state on the server: after the password step, issue a session marked as partially authenticated that allows nothing but the MFA step, and grant access only once the server has verified the second factor. Issue a new session identifier when MFA succeeds.
- Make the MFA decision entirely on the server, never from a client-supplied flag or response value.
- Limit attempts at each one-time code, invalidating the challenge after a small number of failures, make codes single use and short-lived, and bind each code to the account and sign-in attempt it was issued for.
- Enforce the same MFA requirement on every route that accepts the password, including APIs, mobile and legacy endpoints and single sign-on callbacks.
- Protect remember-device features with signed, expiring tokens bound to the device, and require re-authentication with an existing factor before MFA can be disabled, reset or changed, notifying the user when it is.
Confirm the fix by repeating each bypass used in testing and confirming that access is granted only after a valid, unused second factor for the correct account has been presented.
References
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