Multi-Factor Authentication Not Enforced

Users can sign in with a password alone, so a stolen, guessed or reused password is enough to take over an account.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-308: Use of Single-factor Authentication
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1078 Valid Accounts, T1110.004 Credential Stuffing, T1110.003 Password Spraying
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

The application, or one of the routes into it, authenticates users with a password alone. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) may be unavailable, available but optional and largely unused, or enforced on the main web login while other routes that accept the same password, such as an API, a mobile application endpoint, a legacy protocol or an administrative interface, do not require it.

Any attacker who obtains a user's password, through phishing, malware, reuse of a password leaked from another service, password spraying or guessing, can then sign in as that user with nothing further to overcome. Credential stuffing and password spraying are widely automated, so without MFA every account is protected only by the strength and secrecy of its password, and an attacker gains whatever access the compromised account holds.

The finding is confirmed by signing in with valid credentials and observing that no second factor is requested, and by reviewing which account types and access routes MFA covers. It is useful to record whether MFA is absent for everyone, optional for users, or missing for privileged accounts and remote access, since these carry different levels of risk: the impact is greatest for administrators, remote access and accounts holding sensitive or financial data.

Where MFA relies on codes sent by SMS or voice call, it is weaker against SIM swap and interception than authenticator applications or phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys and FIDO2 security keys, though still far stronger than a password alone.

Remediation

  • Enforce MFA for all users, and as a priority for administrative, privileged and remote access accounts and for any account with access to sensitive data.
  • Prefer phishing-resistant methods, such as passkeys or FIDO2 security keys, or authenticator applications using time-based codes or push approval with number matching; treat SMS and voice codes as a fallback rather than the default.
  • Apply MFA to every route that accepts the password, including APIs, mobile and legacy endpoints, and retire protocols that cannot support it.
  • Require a second factor or re-authentication before sensitive actions such as changing the password, email address or MFA settings.
  • Provide secure enrolment and recovery, such as single-use recovery codes, so that the recovery process does not become a way around MFA.
  • Where the application supports single sign-on, delegate authentication to an identity provider that enforces MFA.

Until MFA is enforced, strengthen login rate limiting and breached-password screening, and monitor for password spraying. Confirm the fix by signing in with valid credentials through each route and confirming that a second factor is required.

References


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