NFS Shares Exported to Any Host
An NFS server exports file systems to any host, so anyone on the network can mount them and, by claiming another user's ID, read or change that user's files.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties |
| OWASP Top 10 | A01:2025 Broken Access Control |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive, T1135 Network Share Discovery |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
The NFS server exports one or more directories to every host, through a wildcard (*), an over-broad network range or a malformed export line, instead of to the specific clients that need them. With the default sec=sys (AUTH_SYS) security flavour, the server does not authenticate users: it trusts the numeric user and group IDs that the client presents. An attacker who mounts the export from a system they control can therefore create a local account with any user ID and act as that user on the share.
In this way an attacker on any network that can reach the server can read the exported files by assuming the user IDs that own them, which commonly exposes home directories, application data, backups, SSH keys and configuration files containing credentials. Where an export is writable, they can also change or plant files as any non-root user, for example adding an SSH key to a user's home directory or altering scripts that other systems run, which can lead to code execution elsewhere. The impact depends on what is exported and whether it is writable. Only the root user is mapped to an unprivileged identity by default, through root_squash, and the impact is greater still where root squashing has also been disabled.
The issue is identified by listing exports with showmount -e or the Nmap nfs-showmount script, which also show the clients each export is offered to, then mounting the export from the testing system and reviewing its contents. Scanners report it as NFS shares exported to everyone or as world-readable NFS exports.
Remediation
Limit each export to its clients and stop trusting client-asserted identities:
- Export each directory only to the specific hosts or the smallest network range that needs it, and remove exports that are no longer required. In
/etc/exports, make sure no space separates a client from its option list, because an option list on its own applies to every host. - Use Kerberos security, preferably
sec=krb5p(orkrb5iwhere encryption is not possible), so that users are authenticated rather than trusted by user ID, and do not offersyson sensitive exports. - Export read-only (
ro) wherever clients do not need to write, keeproot_squashin place, and useall_squashfor exports that should only ever be accessed anonymously. - Restrict TCP 2049 and the RPC services NFS relies on with host and network firewall rules.
Apply changes with exportfs -ra. Confirm the fix by listing the exports from an unauthorised host and checking that mounting is refused, and that the remaining exports require Kerberos where it has been configured.
References
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