NULL or Anonymous TLS Cipher Suites Supported

The service accepts NULL cipher suites, which send data unencrypted, or anonymous suites, which encrypt without authenticating the server, removing the protection TLS should give.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.09.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1040 Network Sniffing
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The service accepts cipher suites that remove one of the two protections TLS exists to provide:

  • NULL suites, such as TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, authenticate the server and protect the data against tampering but do not encrypt it, so the content of the session crosses the network in clear text. Where a client and the service agree on one, anyone who can observe the traffic can read everything in the session, including credentials and session tokens.
  • Anonymous suites, such as TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (ADH and AECDH in OpenSSL's naming), encrypt the data but use a key exchange without a certificate, so the client cannot tell whether it is talking to the genuine server. Where they agree on one, an attacker who can intercept the connection can complete a separate key exchange with each side and read or change all of the traffic without either side noticing.

Mainstream browsers never offer these suites, so a connection only uses one when the client offers it too, as scripts, libraries, embedded devices and other software configured with broad cipher lists sometimes do. That limits the exposure, but those clients are often automated integrations that carry credentials or sensitive data. The suites are usually enabled by mistake, through a cipher list built from broad keywords (OpenSSL's ALL, for example, includes the anonymous suites) or through an appliance's defaults. Mail servers using opportunistic STARTTLS sometimes accept anonymous suites deliberately, as unauthenticated encryption between mail servers is still better than none, and the rating should take that context into account.

The suites a service accepts can be listed with testssl.sh, sslscan, SSLyze or Nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script.

Remediation

Remove all NULL and anonymous suites, preferably by replacing the cipher configuration with an explicit list of strong suites (ECDHE key exchange with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) rather than broad keywords:

# OpenSSL-based servers (nginx ssl_ciphers, Apache SSLCipherSuite): # where an explicit list cannot be used yet, append these exclusions !aNULL:!eNULL
  • On Windows, remove any NULL or anonymous suite from the list set through Group Policy (SSL Cipher Suite Order) or with the Disable-TlsCipherSuite cmdlet, and check that no application enables them through its own settings.
  • For Java services, make sure anon and NULL are listed in the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms security property.
  • On load balancers and appliances, select a TLS profile that excludes them.
  • Review the cipher settings of scripts and integrations too, so that clients do not offer these suites to other services.

Where a mail server keeps anonymous suites for opportunistic encryption by design, record the decision and ensure that connections needing authentication, such as those to partner organisations, use verified certificates. Confirm the fix by listing the accepted suites again and checking that no NULL or anonymous suite remains.

References


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