Root or Jailbreak Detection Absent

The mobile application runs normally on rooted or jailbroken devices, without detecting or responding to the weakened platform security.

SeverityInformational
CVSS 3.10 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.00 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

The application does not check whether the device it runs on has been rooted (Android) or jailbroken (iOS), and behaves the same on a compromised device as on a standard one. Rooting and jailbreaking remove operating system protections that the application otherwise relies on, such as the separation between application sandboxes and the restrictions that stop debuggers and instrumentation frameworks attaching to other applications' processes.

The missing check does not expose data by itself, but it removes a layer that would make it harder for someone in control of a device, whether a researcher or an attacker studying the application, to instrument it at runtime, bypass client-side controls such as certificate pinning or biometric checks, and read the application's private storage. It also means that users whose devices have been rooted or jailbroken, sometimes by malware, receive no warning that the protections around their data are weakened.

The weakness is confirmed by installing the application on a rooted or jailbroken test device and observing that it starts and operates normally, with no warning, restriction or report to its server. Static review of the decompiled package shows whether common checks are present, such as searches for su binaries, root management applications, test-keys builds or jailbreak file paths, or the use of platform attestation such as the Play Integrity API. Static analysers such as MobSF can indicate whether known root detection code is present.

Where detection exists but is weak, testing typically finds a single check made at launch, which public tools defeat without customisation, such as objection (android root disable, ios jailbreak disable) or root-hiding modules for Magisk. Detection can always be bypassed by a determined attacker, so its value lies in raising the effort required rather than in preventing attacks. The OWASP MASVS places these controls in its resilience group (MASVS-RESILIENCE), which applies where an application's threat model includes reverse engineering and tampering, as is common for banking, payment and content protection applications.

Remediation

Decide from the application's risk whether resilience controls are warranted. For applications that handle payments, financial data or other high-value functions:

  • On Android, use the Play Integrity API and evaluate its verdicts on the server, not in the application: request an integrity token for sensitive actions, decode and verify it through Google's servers, and act on the device integrity verdict (for example MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY). The SafetyNet Attestation API it replaces is deprecated.
  • On iOS, combine local jailbreak checks with App Attest, which lets the server confirm that requests come from a genuine instance of the application. App Attest does not detect jailbreaks by itself.
  • Implement several independent local checks (files, binaries, writable system locations, hooking frameworks and debuggers), run them at different points rather than once at launch, and protect them with obfuscation so that hooking one function cannot disable them all. A maintained library or commercial runtime protection product is usually more resilient than in-house code.
  • Respond proportionately and enforce the response on the server: warn the user, restrict high-risk functions such as payments or credential changes, and record the event, rather than relying only on the application closing.
  • Do not treat detection as a security boundary. Data and functions must remain protected by server-side controls and the platform keystores even when detection is bypassed.

Confirm the fix on rooted and jailbroken test devices, including with off-the-shelf bypass tools, and check that the server receives and acts on the integrity signals.

References


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