Secure Boot Not Enabled

UEFI Secure Boot is disabled, so the firmware will start boot loaders and other early boot code without checking that a trusted publisher signed them.

SeverityLow
CVSS 3.13.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.04.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1542.003 Bootkit
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

UEFI Secure Boot is a firmware feature that checks the digital signature of each piece of code the firmware loads before the operating system, such as the boot loader, UEFI drivers and option ROMs, against keys and hashes held in the firmware's signature databases, and refuses to run code that is not trusted or has been revoked. The operating system then extends that chain of trust to its kernel and early drivers. When Secure Boot is disabled, when the device boots in legacy BIOS mode (often labelled CSM, the Compatibility Support Module), or when the firmware is left in Setup Mode with no platform key installed, these checks are not made and any boot code on the system will run.

An attacker who has already gained administrative or root rights on the operating system, or who has physical access to the device, can then install a bootkit: malicious code in the boot loader or the EFI system partition that runs before the operating system and its security software. Code running at that stage can tamper with the operating system as it loads, hide from endpoint protection, and survive the removal of the attacker's other footholds. Disabling Secure Boot also weakens protections built on it, such as virtualisation-based security on Windows and the kernel lockdown that many Linux distributions apply when Secure Boot is on. The weakness does not by itself give an attacker access or privileges, which is why it is rated low; its significance lies in the stealth and persistence it allows after another compromise.

It is commonly found on older hardware, on systems originally installed in legacy BIOS mode, on virtual machines created without Secure Boot support, such as Hyper-V generation 1 virtual machines, and on Linux hosts where it was turned off to allow unsigned kernel modules or drivers to load. The state can be confirmed on Windows with the System Information tool (msinfo32, Secure Boot State) or the PowerShell cmdlet Confirm-SecureBootUEFI, and on Linux with mokutil --sb-state; endpoint management and configuration review tools also report it.

Remediation

Enable Secure Boot on every device whose hardware and operating system support it, and keep it enabled:

  • In the UEFI firmware settings, set the boot mode to UEFI only, with legacy or CSM boot disabled, and enable Secure Boot with the platform's default keys. Windows devices installed in legacy BIOS mode first need their system disk converted from MBR to GPT, which the MBR2GPT tool can do without reinstalling.
  • Set a firmware administrator password so that Secure Boot cannot be turned off again without authorisation.
  • On Linux, where Secure Boot was disabled to load unsigned kernel modules, sign the modules with a local key and register that key as a Machine Owner Key (mokutil --import) instead.
  • For virtual machines, use a type that supports Secure Boot, such as Hyper-V generation 2 virtual machines, VMware virtual machines with EFI firmware, Azure Trusted Launch or Google Cloud Shielded VM, and enable it in the template.
  • Report and enforce the setting centrally, for example with an Intune compliance policy that requires Secure Boot, so that devices that drift are found.
  • Keep firmware and the Secure Boot revocation list (dbx) up to date, since old boot managers with known flaws remain trusted until they are revoked.

Where older hardware cannot support Secure Boot, restrict administrative rights on it, protect its firmware with a password and include it in the hardware replacement plan. Confirm the fix with Confirm-SecureBootUEFI, which should return True, or msinfo32 on Windows, and with mokutil --sb-state on Linux.

References


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