SNMP Version 1 or 2c in Use

The device uses SNMP version 1 or 2c, which send community strings and all management data unencrypted and authenticate requests only by that shared string.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1040 Network Sniffing, T1602.001 SNMP (MIB Dump)
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The device's SNMP agent accepts SNMP version 1 or version 2c. These versions have no real authentication and no encryption: each request carries a community string, which acts as a shared password, in plain text, and the replies, including everything read from the device, such as interface, routing and system information, can be read just as easily.

An attacker who can observe traffic between the management systems and the devices they poll, for example from a compromised host on the same network segment or from the monitoring server itself, can capture the community strings and then read from, or where the community allows it, write to every device that shares them. Community strings are often the same across all of an organisation's devices, so one capture can expose many. Because SNMP normally runs over UDP, the source address of a request is also easy to forge, so access lists based on source address give less protection against write requests than they appear to. The attack needs a position where the traffic can be seen, which usually means access to the internal or management network.

SNMPv3, standardised in 2002, adds a user-based security model with message authentication and encryption, and is supported by almost all current network equipment and management platforms. A device that still accepts version 1 or 2c is identified when it answers such a request made with a valid community string, or from its configuration; snmpwalk and the Nmap SNMP scripts show the version that was answered. Monitoring traffic captured on the network shows the community strings directly.

Remediation

Move SNMP to version 3 with authentication and encryption:

  • Configure SNMPv3 users at the authPriv security level, with SHA-based authentication (SHA-2 where the device supports it) and AES encryption, and with separate credentials for read and write access where write access is needed at all.
  • Update the monitoring and management platforms to poll with SNMPv3, then remove all version 1 and 2c communities from the devices, so that the agent no longer answers those versions.
  • Restrict SNMP to the management stations that need it, with access lists on the devices and filtering of UDP ports 161 and 162 at network boundaries, and keep management traffic on a dedicated management network where possible.
  • Where a device cannot support SNMPv3, use a long, random, read-only community string that is unique to the device or group of devices, restrict it to the polling hosts, and plan the device's replacement.

Confirm the fix by sending version 1 and 2c requests with the old community strings and checking that they are ignored, and by checking that the monitoring platform still collects data over SNMPv3.

References


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