User Account Control Disabled or Weakened
User Account Control is disabled or configured so that administrators' programs gain full rights without a prompt, removing a barrier to malware and remote misuse.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 6.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
User Account Control (UAC) is turned off, or configured so that it no longer separates administrators' everyday programs from administrative ones. The settings involved are held under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System and set by the matching Group Policy security options:
EnableLUAset to 0, which disables User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode and turns UAC off, so every program an administrator runs has full rights.ConsentPromptBehaviorAdminset to 0 (Elevate without prompting), which lets programs gain full rights silently.PromptOnSecureDesktopset to 0, which shows the prompt on the normal desktop, where malicious software can more easily imitate or interfere with it.LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicyset to 1, which gives local administrator accounts full rights over the network and removes the restriction that blocks remote administration with local accounts: a password or hash for any local administrator account can then be used to run commands on the host over the network, which makes reuse of a local administrator password across hosts far more damaging.
Where UAC is off or elevates without prompting, malware or an attacker running as an administrator's account gains full administrative rights immediately, without the user seeing or approving a prompt, so a single phishing payload opened by an administrator can disable security tools, extract credentials and persist. Microsoft does not treat UAC as a security boundary and bypass techniques exist, so the main effect is to remove a layer that stops much commodity malware rather than to open a new route on its own.
The weakness is identified by reading these values with reg query or from the resultant Group Policy, and configuration review tools and credentialed scans report them.
Remediation
Restore the Windows defaults or stricter values through Group Policy, under Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options:
- User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode: Enabled.
User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode: Prompt for consent on the secure desktop, or Prompt for credentials on the secure desktop.- User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation: Enabled.
User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users: Automatically deny elevation requests, where standard users should not elevate.
Set LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 0 or remove it, for example with the Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons setting from Microsoft's security baseline templates, and make local administrator passwords unique on each host. A change to EnableLUA takes effect after a restart. Confirm the fix by checking the registry values after policy refresh and confirming that an administrator's programs run with a filtered token until elevation is approved.
References
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