AD CS EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 Enabled (ESC6)
The CA accepts a requester-supplied subject alternative name on every certificate request, letting users ask for certificates that name other identities.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 7.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, T1550.003 Pass the Ticket |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
The EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag is set in the policy module settings of an enterprise CA. With the flag set, the CA accepts a subject alternative name supplied as a request attribute (for example san:upn= followed by an account name) on any request, whatever the template specifies, so every published template that permits authentication and lets ordinary users enrol, such as the default User template, behaves as though the requester could choose the identity in the certificate. It is documented as ESC6 in the Certified Pre-Owned research. The flag is sometimes enabled so that web servers or devices can obtain certificates with additional names.
Since Microsoft's certificate-based authentication changes (KB5014754), CAs add the requester's security identifier (SID) to certificates built from Active Directory information, and domain controllers that enforce strong certificate mapping reject a certificate whose SAN names a different account from that SID. Where the SID extension is absent, because a template or the CA omits it, or strong mapping is not enforced, the flag is directly exploitable: any user who can enrol in an authentication template can obtain a certificate for a domain administrator and take control of the domain.
On fully updated domain controllers that enforce strong mapping, the flag is normally blocked for Kerberos authentication on its own. It still lets any enrolee obtain certificates naming arbitrary identities, which other systems that map certificates to users by their SAN alone may accept, and it turns any later weakening of the mapping into an immediate route to domain compromise.
Any domain user can read the flag remotely with certutil, and Certipy, Certify and PingCastle report it.
Remediation
Turn the flag off on every CA where it is set, after confirming nothing depends on it, and restart the CA service:
- Check the result with
certutil -getreg policy\EditFlags, which should no longer list the flag. - Provide for any legitimate need for multi-name certificates, such as web servers, with a dedicated template that allows a requester-supplied subject, has no authentication EKU, and is restricted to the administrators who request such certificates.
- Make sure every domain controller enforces strong certificate mapping (Full Enforcement, the default since the February 2025 updates), that no template sets
CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION(ESC9), and that the CA has not been configured to disable the SID extension (ESC16). - Review the CA database for certificates issued with a SAN supplied as a request attribute, and revoke any that are not legitimate.
Confirm the fix by requesting a certificate from a user template with a SAN attribute naming another account: the certificate issued should contain only the requester's identity.
References
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