Authorisation Enforced Only by the Client
The server relies on the desktop client to restrict what each user can do, so a user who alters the client or calls the server directly can bypass those restrictions.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
The application decides what each user may see and do in the client rather than on the server. The client hides menu items, disables buttons or filters data according to the user's role, but the server accepts the corresponding requests from any authenticated user, or trusts a role or permission value that the client sends.
Everything in a thick client is under the control of the person running it. A user can decompile, modify or patch the client, change values in memory or in local configuration files, re-enable hidden controls with tools that manipulate the user interface, or bypass the client entirely by sending requests straight to the server once its protocol is understood from intercepted traffic. Any restriction that exists only in the client can therefore be removed.
Doing so lets any authenticated user perform actions and reach data reserved for more privileged roles, such as viewing other users' records, changing configuration or approvals, or carrying out administrative functions, limited only by what the server will do on request. Because the server records these as legitimate requests from that user, misuse may go unnoticed. The attacker needs a valid account, which is why this is rated high rather than critical.
The weakness is identified by signing in as a low-privileged user, capturing or replaying requests that only a higher-privileged role should be able to make, and observing that the server processes them. It is also found by modifying the client, for example by changing a role check in a decompiled assembly with dnSpy, or by editing a server response that tells the client which features to enable.
Remediation
Enforce every authorisation decision on the server:
- For every request, have the server establish the user's identity from its own authenticated session, and check the user's role and permissions against the action and the specific record before doing anything. Never accept a role, permission or user identifier from the client as the basis for a decision.
- Apply the checks centrally, for example in middleware or a common service layer, and deny by default, so that a new function cannot be added without a check.
- Keep client-side restrictions only as a usability feature, consistent with the server's rules.
- Where the client connects directly to a database, move business logic and authorisation into a server-side API or, as an interim step, into stored procedures that check the caller's permissions.
- Add automated tests that call each function as each role and confirm that unauthorised calls are refused.
Confirm the fix by repeating the original requests as a low-privileged user, outside the client, and confirming that the server refuses them.
References
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