Insecure Software Update Mechanism

The client downloads and installs updates without verifying they are authentic, so an attacker who can intercept or alter them can run code on every client.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
OWASP Top 10A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The application's update mechanism does not establish that an update genuinely comes from the vendor before installing it. Typical forms are an updater that fetches its update manifest or package over HTTP; one that uses HTTPS but accepts any certificate; one that checks only a hash supplied in the same unprotected response; and one that installs whatever it finds in a network share or folder that users can write to.

An attacker able to intercept or redirect the client's update traffic, for example from the same network segment with ARP or DNS spoofing, or anyone able to write to the update location, can therefore make every affected client run their code. Updaters often run with administrative or SYSTEM privileges, for example as a Windows service, so that they can replace the application's files, and the attacker's code then runs with those privileges, giving full control of the affected workstations at once. The attacker needs a network position or access to the update source first, which is reflected in the rating.

The weakness is identified by observing the update process: capturing its traffic to see how it locates and downloads updates, reviewing the update client in a decompiler to see what it verifies, and checking the permissions of any share or directory it installs from. Exploitation is confirmed by serving a modified update, from an intercepting proxy or a test server the client is directed to, and observing that the client installs and runs it. Related variants include the absence of protection against downgrade to an older, vulnerable version, and verification carried out on a file in a user-writable location that can be swapped after it has been checked.

Remediation

Make the client verify every update cryptographically before it is used:

  • Sign update packages and manifests, and have the updater verify the signature against the vendor's own key or certificate, built into the client, before doing anything else with the package. For Windows installers and executables, verify the Authenticode signature with WinVerifyTrust and check that the signer is the expected publisher, not merely that a valid signature is present.
  • Download updates over HTTPS with full certificate validation, as an additional layer rather than a replacement for signatures.
  • Reject updates whose version is lower than the installed one, unless a rollback is deliberately authorised.
  • Download and verify updates in a directory that only the updater can write to, and install from that same copy, so the file cannot be swapped between check and use.
  • Run the updater with the least privilege it needs, and restrict write access to any update share to the release process.
  • Consider an established packaging and update format that already signs and verifies packages, such as MSIX.

Confirm the fix by repeating the test with a modified update and an unsigned update, and confirming that both are rejected.

References


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