AWS Root User Used or Holding Access Keys

The AWS account's root user has active access keys or is used for routine work, exposing credentials with unrestricted control of the account.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.09.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
MITRE ATT&CKT1078.004 Cloud Accounts
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Every AWS account has a root user, identified by the email address used to create the account, with complete access to all resources and to billing. IAM policies cannot limit it; in a member account of an AWS organisation, service control policies can. AWS's guidance is that the root user should not be used for everyday tasks, should have no access keys, and should be protected with MFA.

The finding covers two related conditions. The first is root access keys: the IAM credential report shows access_key_1_active or access_key_2_active as true on the <root_account> row, which means long-term keys with full control of the account are stored somewhere, often in scripts, CI systems or a workstation's credentials file. Anyone who obtains a root access key, or the root password where MFA is absent, has unrestricted control of the account: they can read and destroy all data, create users and roles for persistence, disable CloudTrail and other monitoring, change the account's contact and payment details, and close the account. Root activity is not constrained by IAM permissions, so least-privilege controls do not limit the damage.

The second is routine use: the credential report shows recent password_last_used or key use for the root user, or CloudTrail records events whose userIdentity type is Root for tasks that do not require it. Routine use increases the chance of the root credentials being phished or captured on an administrator's workstation, and weakens accountability, because actions are recorded against the account rather than a named person.

Testers also check whether the root user has MFA (mfa_active in the same report) and, in an AWS organisation, whether centralised root access has been enabled so that member accounts hold no root credentials at all.

Remediation

Remove root access keys and limit the root user to the few tasks that require it:

  • Delete the root access keys from the root user's security credentials page, after identifying from the credential report and CloudTrail what used them and moving those processes to IAM roles or other short-term credentials.
  • Protect the root user with MFA, preferably a passkey or FIDO security key, and hold its password and MFA device under controlled custody for break-glass use.
  • Use IAM Identity Center or IAM roles for all administration, and reserve the root user for the tasks that only it can perform.
  • In an AWS organisation, enable trusted access for IAM and then centralised root access for member accounts (aws iam enable-organizations-root-credentials-management and aws iam enable-organizations-root-sessions), remove member accounts' root credentials, and carry out the rare privileged root tasks through short-term sessions from the management account using sts:AssumeRoot.
  • Alert on root user activity, for example with an Amazon EventBridge rule or a CloudWatch Logs metric filter on CloudTrail events where userIdentity.type is Root.

Confirm the fix with a new credential report showing no active root access keys and mfa_active as true for the root user, and with no unexplained root activity in CloudTrail.

References


Add This Finding to Your Library

In Pental this write-up is in Settings, Library. Add to my library copies it into your own, rated in your firm's CVSS version, ready to put in your own words.

Free trial  ·  No card required

Only need the reporting? Our reporting tool is free and open source, with the same library.


More AWS Findings

Every AWS finding