Public EBS or RDS Snapshots

EBS or RDS snapshots are shared publicly, so any AWS account can copy them and read the full contents of the disks or databases they hold.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
OWASP Top 10A01:2025 Broken Access Control
MITRE ATT&CKT1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

EBS snapshots and manual RDS DB snapshots can be shared with other AWS accounts or made public. A public EBS snapshot has a createVolumePermission grant to the group all, and a public RDS snapshot has the value all in its restore attribute. Only unencrypted snapshots can be made public; encrypted snapshots can be shared only with specific accounts. Public snapshots are usually created by mistake, for example while trying to share with a single account, or by scripts and templates that set public permissions.

Once a snapshot is public, any AWS account can find it among public snapshots, copy it, create a volume or restore a database from it, and so read a complete copy of the disk or database as it was when the snapshot was taken: application data, personal data, password hashes, configuration files, private keys and cloud credentials stored on the volume. No authentication to the organisation is needed, and researchers and attackers are known to search public snapshots for credentials and data. Credentials found in a snapshot can lead to further compromise of the organisation's systems, and because a copy cannot be recalled once taken, the contents of a snapshot that was public for any length of time should be treated as disclosed.

The issue is identified with aws ec2 describe-snapshots --owner-ids self --restorable-by-user-ids all and aws rds describe-db-snapshot-attributes, and can be confirmed from an unrelated account by listing public snapshots owned by the organisation's account ID. Prowler, ScoutSuite, Security Hub and AWS Trusted Advisor report public snapshots.

Remediation

Remove public permissions and prevent them being granted again:

  • Remove public sharing from each EBS snapshot (aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id "$SNAPSHOT_ID" --attribute createVolumePermission --operation-type remove --group-names all) and each RDS snapshot (aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier "$SNAPSHOT_ID" --attribute-name restore --values-to-remove all).
  • Enable block public access for EBS snapshots in every Region (aws ec2 enable-snapshot-block-public-access --state block-all-sharing), which also stops snapshots that are already public from being publicly available.
  • Enable EBS encryption by default and encrypt RDS instances, since encrypted snapshots cannot be made public.
  • Share snapshots only with specific account IDs, restrict ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute and rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute to administrators, and consider a service control policy that denies public sharing.
  • Treat the contents of any snapshot that was public as disclosed: rotate the credentials and keys it contained and assess whether breach notification is required.

Confirm the fix by repeating the searches for public snapshots, and with aws ec2 get-snapshot-block-public-access-state showing block-all-sharing in each Region.

References


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