Constrained Delegation Allowing Privilege Escalation
Accounts configured for Kerberos constrained or resource-based delegation can impersonate any unprotected user, including administrators, to sensitive services.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, T1550.003 Pass the Ticket |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
One or more accounts are configured for Kerberos constrained delegation in a way that lets whoever controls the account gain privileged access to another system. Classic constrained delegation lists the services an account may access on behalf of users in its msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute; resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) instead lists, in the target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute, the accounts allowed to delegate to it.
The configuration becomes a privilege escalation path when the delegating account can impersonate users to a sensitive service, most often on a domain controller, and particularly when protocol transition is enabled (Use any authentication protocol, shown by the TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION flag). An attacker who obtains the credentials of the delegating account, or administrative control of the computer it belongs to, can then use the S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy Kerberos extensions to obtain a ticket to the listed service as any user who is not protected from delegation, including domain administrators, without that user's involvement. Because the service name in the resulting ticket is not cryptographically protected, a ticket for one service can be rewritten for another that runs under the same account, such as CIFS or LDAP on the same host.
Where those services are on a domain controller this gives control of the domain; where they are on member servers it gives administrative access to those servers. Accounts marked as sensitive, or in the Protected Users group, cannot be impersonated in this way. Exploitation requires control of the delegating account first, which is why such accounts and their hosts need the same protection as the systems they can reach.
A related path exists where ordinary users can write the RBCD attribute of a computer object, which lets them grant themselves this ability over that computer. Impacket's findDelegation.py, BloodHound (the AllowedToDelegate and AllowedToAct edges) and PingCastle identify these configurations.
Remediation
- Review every account with
msDS-AllowedToDelegateTopopulated or theTRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATIONflag set, and every object with RBCD configured, and remove delegation that is no longer needed. - Do not allow delegation to services on domain controllers or other Tier 0 systems. Where delegation is needed, limit it to the specific service on the specific host, and use Use Kerberos only rather than protocol transition unless the application requires it.
- Protect delegating accounts and their hosts as highly privileged: use group managed service accounts or long random passwords, and restrict administrative access to the servers concerned.
- Select Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated on privileged accounts, or add them to the Protected Users group.
- Remove rights that let non-administrative users write
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentityon computer objects, such as GenericWrite or GenericAll granted to broad groups.
Confirm the fix by repeating these queries and the BloodHound analysis.
References
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group
- attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558
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