DMARC Policy Missing or Not Enforced
The domain has no DMARC record, or one with a policy of none, so receivers are not told to reject or quarantine mail that forges the domain in the From address.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1684.002 Email Spoofing, T1566 Phishing |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC, RFC 7489) is published as a DNS TXT record at _dmarc under the domain. It tells receiving mail servers what to do with a message whose visible From address uses the domain but which does not pass SPF or DKIM in alignment with that address: deliver it as normal (p=none), treat it as suspicious (p=quarantine) or reject it (p=reject). It also asks receivers to send aggregate reports (rua) showing which servers send mail as the domain, which an organisation without a record never receives. DMARC is the control that protects the From address recipients see; a forged message can pass SPF or DKIM on its own by using the attacker's own domain in the envelope sender or signature.
Without an enforced policy, an attacker can send email showing the organisation's exact domain in the From address, and receivers that would honour a policy deliver it. Such messages are used for phishing, invoice and payment fraud and impersonation of senior staff, and towards customers and suppliers they are more convincing than lookalike domains because the address is genuine. Many receiving services apply their own checks and may still flag some forged mail, so the effect varies by recipient, but the organisation has no control over that.
The weakness covers a missing record; a policy of none left in place after the monitoring period; a pct value below 100, which under RFC 7489 applies the policy to only part of the failing mail; a subdomain policy of sp=none, which leaves subdomains unprotected; and records with syntax errors, which receivers ignore. It is identified with a DNS query for the _dmarc TXT record and a review of its policy tags.
Remediation
Publish a DMARC record for every domain and move it to an enforced policy:
- Make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF or DKIM in alignment with the From domain, preferably DKIM, which survives forwarding.
- Publish a record in monitoring mode with aggregate reporting to a mailbox or reporting service, for example:
- Review the aggregate reports, correct or authorise any legitimate sender that fails, then move to
p=quarantineand thenp=reject, withpctat 100 or omitted. - Set a subdomain policy (
sp=quarantineorsp=reject) unless subdomains publish their own records, and publishv=DMARC1; p=rejectfor domains that send no mail at all, including parked domains. - Use a DMARC reporting tool or service to read the reports, as the raw XML is hard to review at volume.
Confirm the fix by querying the _dmarc record and checking that the policy is quarantine or reject and applies to all mail, then sending a test message that fails alignment from an outside server and checking that a major mailbox provider rejects or quarantines it.
References
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