SMTP STARTTLS Not Supported

The domain's inbound mail server does not offer STARTTLS, so email delivered to it from other mail servers crosses the internet unencrypted.

SeverityLow
CVSS 3.13.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1040 Network Sniffing, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

Mail servers exchange email over SMTP on TCP port 25. The STARTTLS extension (RFC 3207) lets a sending server upgrade the connection to TLS before transferring the message, and mail servers on the internet generally do so whenever the receiving server offers it. The mail exchanger (MX) host for the domain does not advertise STARTTLS in its response to EHLO, or advertises it but cannot complete the TLS handshake, so senders deliver messages to it in clear text.

An attacker able to observe the traffic between a sender's server and the MX host, for example on a compromised network segment, at a provider on the path, or on the same network as either server, can therefore read email sent to the organisation, including any attachments, personal data or credentials it contains, and could alter it in transit. Obtaining such a position is not easy, which limits the likelihood, but interception would go unnoticed. Without STARTTLS the domain also cannot adopt MTA-STS, and senders whose policies require TLS for the domain will not deliver to it.

The weakness is identified by connecting to each MX host on port 25, for example with openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect or swaks --tls, and examining the EHLO response and the handshake. Causes include older or misconfigured mail servers and gateways, a certificate that was allowed to lapse with TLS switched off rather than renewed, and secondary or backup MX hosts that were not configured like the primary. This finding concerns delivery between mail servers; clear-text client protocols such as POP3, IMAP and authenticated SMTP submission are covered separately.

Remediation

Enable STARTTLS on every MX host for the domain:

  • Install a certificate that is valid for the MX host name, issued by a public certification authority, and enable STARTTLS on the SMTP service. For example, in Postfix set smtpd_tls_security_level = may with smtpd_tls_cert_file and smtpd_tls_key_file; in Exim set tls_advertise_hosts = * with tls_certificate and tls_privatekey; and in Exchange Server assign the certificate to the SMTP service with Enable-ExchangeCertificate and its -Services SMTP parameter.
  • Configure protocol versions and cipher suites in line with the organisation's TLS standard, preferring TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
  • Apply the same configuration to secondary and backup MX hosts and to any mail gateway or filtering service in front of the server.
  • Keep TLS opportunistic for inbound mail in general, so that the few senders without TLS are not rejected, unless policy requires otherwise, and publish an MTA-STS policy so that senders which support it insist on TLS.
  • Monitor certificate expiry, since senders that validate certificates, such as those applying MTA-STS, will not deliver to a host whose certificate has expired.

Confirm the fix by connecting to each MX host on port 25 and checking that STARTTLS is advertised and the handshake completes with a valid certificate.

References


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