Domain Controllers Can Be Coerced to Authenticate

Domain controllers expose RPC interfaces that let any domain user make them authenticate to a chosen host, where their credentials can be relayed or captured.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
OWASP Top 10A01:2025 Broken Access Control
MITRE ATT&CKT1187 Forced Authentication, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Several Windows RPC interfaces accept a path or address from the caller and make the server connect to it, authenticating as its own computer account. On domain controllers, the methods most often abused are the print spooler's MS-RPRN interface (the printer bug), the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), the DFS Namespace Management Protocol MS-DFSNM (DFSCoerce) and, where the File Server VSS Agent Service is installed, MS-FSRVP (ShadowCoerce). Any authenticated domain user can call them where the corresponding service is running. Updates have closed some routes, such as unauthenticated PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942), but authenticated coercion through several of these interfaces still works on fully updated systems.

Coercion on its own gives an attacker only an authentication attempt, but combined with a suitable target it usually leads to control of the domain, so what matters is where the authentication can be sent: to AD CS web enrolment without Extended Protection for Authentication, to a host configured for unconstrained delegation that the attacker controls, or to an attacker's listener where the domain controller sends NTLMv1. Relaying a domain controller's authentication to AD CS web enrolment produces a certificate for the domain controller, and coercing it to authenticate to a host with unconstrained delegation exposes its Kerberos ticket-granting ticket; either allows every password hash in the domain to be replicated with DCSync. Exploitation needs a domain account, network access to the domain controller and a usable target, and the rating reflects that dependence.

Coercer and NetExec's coercion modules test each known method. A successful test shows an incoming authentication from the domain controller's computer account at the tester's listener.

Remediation

  • Remove the targets, which is the most effective step: enable Extended Protection for Authentication and require HTTPS on AD CS web enrolment, or remove it; remove unconstrained delegation from every host other than domain controllers; refuse NTLMv1; and require SMB signing and LDAP signing and channel binding.
  • Stop and disable the Print Spooler service on domain controllers, as Microsoft recommends, and on other servers that do not need it.
  • Block the RPC interfaces that are not needed, such as MS-EFSR and MS-DFSNM, with RPC filters (netsh rpc filter) or an endpoint security product that offers equivalent controls, after testing that file encryption and DFS administration are not affected.
  • Restrict outbound connections from domain controllers to the networks and services they need, so that they cannot reach an attacker's listener over SMB or HTTP.
  • Keep domain controllers up to date, and restrict NTLM on them where the estate allows, since most relay routes depend on it.

Confirm the fix by repeating the coercion tests against each domain controller and the relay attempts against each target; no usable authentication should reach the listener.

References


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