Excessive Cached Domain Credentials

Windows hosts keep verifiers for many recent domain sign-ins, which an attacker with administrative access can extract and try to crack, including those of administrators.

SeverityLow
CVSS 3.11.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.01.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials, T1110.002 Password Cracking
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

So that users can sign in when no domain controller can be reached, Windows stores a verifier for each of the most recent domain accounts to sign in interactively, known as cached domain credentials or DCC2 (MS-Cache v2) hashes. The number kept is set by Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available), stored as CachedLogonsCount under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon, and is 10 by default.

The verifiers are held in the SECURITY registry hive. They cannot be used for pass-the-hash, but an attacker with administrative rights on the host can extract them with tools such as Impacket's secretsdump.py or Mimikatz (lsadump::cache) and attack them offline, for example with hashcat. On servers and shared workstations the accounts that last signed in can include administrators and service desk staff, and a cracked password works anywhere the account is valid and may lead to privilege escalation. The algorithm applies PBKDF2 with 10,240 iterations, so cracking is slow and mainly succeeds against weak or common passwords: the slow hashing protects long and unusual passwords, and the need for administrative access to the host first limits the risk further.

The finding is reported where hosts cache more entries than they need, particularly servers, which rarely need to work without a domain controller, and where the cached entries include privileged accounts. It is identified from the policy or registry value, and on a test by listing the cached entries on a compromised host.

Remediation

  • Reduce Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options) to 0 on servers that always have a domain controller available, and to a small number such as 1 or 2 on laptops and other devices that need offline sign-in.
  • Keep a local administrator account managed by Windows LAPS on servers, so that administrators can still sign in if no domain controller can be reached.
  • Add privileged accounts to Protected Users, whose members' verifiers are not cached, and keep privileged accounts off hosts where they are not needed.
  • Require long passwords or passphrases for administrative accounts, so that any verifier that is extracted resists cracking.

Confirm the fix by checking the effective value on a sample of hosts, for example with gpresult or by reading CachedLogonsCount in the registry.

References


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