Excessive Microsoft Exchange Permissions in Active Directory
Exchange security groups hold broad write permissions in the domain, in older deployments including the right to change its permissions, so control of Exchange can become control of the domain.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1003.006 DCSync, T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
Exchange Server setup prepares Active Directory by creating security groups in the Microsoft Exchange Security Groups organisational unit and granting them extensive permissions across the domain. In the default shared permissions model, the Exchange Windows Permissions group, which contains Exchange Trusted Subsystem and through it the computer account of every Exchange server, can modify many attributes of users and groups throughout the domain, and in older deployments it also holds WriteDacl on the domain object itself.
An attacker who gains control of an Exchange server, for example through one of the remote code execution vulnerabilities that have affected internet-facing Exchange servers, can use these permissions to change users and groups across the domain. Where WriteDacl on the domain object remains, they can grant themselves or any other account the directory replication rights used by DCSync and extract every password hash in the domain. The PrivExchange research published in January 2019 showed that an Exchange server could be made to authenticate to an attacker, who relayed that authentication to LDAP to grant exactly these rights. Members of Exchange's administrative role groups, such as Organization Management, can by default change the membership of these groups, so an attacker who controls one of their accounts can do the same. Exchange servers and Exchange administrators are then, in effect, part of the most privileged tier, whether or not that is recognised.
Microsoft's cumulative updates of February 2019 reduced the permissions, but only where the domain is prepared again with the updated setup, so they persist in domains not prepared since, and in forests where Exchange was removed or its mailboxes moved to Exchange Online without its groups and permissions being cleaned up. Where the domain-level permission has been removed, the remaining rights over users and groups still allow significant changes, though not always a direct path to domain control.
The permissions are identified with BloodHound, which shows the paths from Exchange groups and servers to the domain, or by reviewing the permissions on the domain object and the membership of the Exchange groups.
Remediation
- Install the latest cumulative update for the Exchange version in use and run its Active Directory preparation (
Setup.exe /PrepareAD, with the licence acceptance parameter that version requires), which applies Microsoft's reduced permissions. Then check the domain object and remove anyWriteDaclstill granted to Exchange groups. - Where Exchange is no longer used on premises, decommission the remaining servers following Microsoft's guidance, and remove the permissions and groups it created once nothing depends on them.
- Consider Active Directory split permissions (
Setup.exe /PrepareAD /ActiveDirectorySplitPermissions:true), which removes Exchange's ability to create security principals and change most of their attributes, where recipients can be managed with Active Directory tools instead. - Treat Exchange servers and the members of Exchange administrative role groups as Tier 0: keep the role groups' membership to a minimum, restrict who can sign in to the servers, apply security updates promptly, and expose to the internet only the services that are needed.
- Monitor changes to the domain object's security descriptor (Audit Directory Service Changes, event 5136) and to the membership of the Exchange groups.
Confirm the fix by repeating the BloodHound analysis and checking that no Exchange group or server holds WriteDacl, WriteOwner or full control on the domain object, and that no remaining path leads from Exchange to privileged groups.
References
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