Insecure TLS Renegotiation Supported
The service allows TLS renegotiation without the RFC 5746 secure renegotiation extension, letting an attacker in the middle inject data at the start of a victim's session.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-300: Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| CVE | CVE-2009-3555 |
| Category | Cryptographic Failures |
Description
TLS renegotiation lets either party start a new handshake within an existing connection, for example to request a client certificate partway through a session. In its original design, the new handshake was not cryptographically tied to the connection it took place on. An attacker in the middle could therefore open a connection to the server, send data of their choosing, and then pass the victim's own handshake through as a renegotiation of that connection: the server treats the attacker's data and the victim's as one stream, while the victim sees an ordinary new connection (CVE-2009-3555).
This lets an attacker able to intercept a victim's connection make the server process a request of the attacker's choosing as if the victim had sent it. With HTTPS, the attacker's request can be combined with the victim's session cookie or client certificate, so the server carries out an action, such as a change or a transfer, under the victim's identity. The attacker cannot read the response, which limits the direct exposure of data, though in some applications the injected request can cause the victim's data to be sent somewhere the attacker can see it. The attack needs an interception position and depends on how the application handles the combined request.
RFC 5746 fixed the flaw in 2010 with the renegotiation indication extension, which binds each renegotiation to the handshake before it. The finding means that the service does not support this extension yet still allows renegotiation, which usually points to a TLS library or appliance firmware that has not been updated for many years. TLS 1.3 removed renegotiation altogether.
The issue is shown by openssl s_client, which reports Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported, and by testssl.sh, sslscan and vulnerability scanners. A separate but related finding is client-initiated renegotiation, where a server lets clients repeatedly start new handshakes and can be made to spend disproportionate processing effort, as exploited by tools such as THC-SSL-DOS (CVE-2011-1473).
Remediation
Update the TLS library or firmware so that the service supports secure renegotiation as defined in RFC 5746, and disable renegotiation wherever it is not needed:
- Apply the operating system or appliance vendor's updates. All currently supported TLS libraries implement RFC 5746, so the finding usually indicates software that is long out of support.
- Disable client-initiated renegotiation, which few applications need, to remove the related denial of service risk. Where server-initiated renegotiation is used only to request client certificates, consider requiring the certificate during the initial handshake instead.
- Enable TLS 1.3, which does not support renegotiation.
Until the update is possible, restrict the service to trusted networks. Confirm the fix with openssl s_client, which should report Secure Renegotiation IS supported, and by rescanning the service.
References
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