KRBTGT Password Not Recently Changed

The krbtgt account's password has not been changed for a long time, so Kerberos tickets forged with keys stolen at any point since then are still accepted.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-324: Use of a Key Past its Expiration Date
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1558.001 Golden Ticket
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Every Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) in an Active Directory domain is encrypted and signed with keys derived from the password of the built-in krbtgt account. Domain controllers accept any TGT that those keys validate, so whoever holds them can create tickets for any user, with any group memberships and lifetime, without contacting a domain controller. Tickets forged in this way are known as golden tickets.

The krbtgt password is set to a random value when the domain is created, and Windows does not change it on any schedule. Unless an administrator resets it, the same keys can stay in use for many years, through the replacement of every domain controller. Any past compromise of the domain, of a domain controller or of a backup of the directory database (ntds.dit) since the last reset will therefore have exposed keys that still work. An attacker who obtained them in that time, for example during an earlier intrusion or from an old backup, can forge tickets that make them a domain administrator or let them act as any account, and can keep doing so until the password has been reset twice. This gives a long-lived and hard-to-detect way back into full control of the domain, even after the original intrusion has been cleaned up and other passwords changed.

The weakness does not give access on its own: it prolongs the effect of a compromise that has already happened, and it matters more the longer it has been since the last reset and the more incidents, administrators and backups there have been in that time. It is identified from the pwdLastSet attribute of the krbtgt account, which any domain user can read, for example with Get-ADUser krbtgt -Properties PasswordLastSet. Directory assessment tools such as PingCastle report its age, and a date close to the domain's creation shows that the password has never been reset.

Remediation

  • Reset the krbtgt password twice. Domain controllers accept tickets issued under the current and the previous key, so only the second reset invalidates a stolen key. Let the first change replicate to every domain controller and wait at least the maximum user ticket lifetime (10 hours by default) before the second, so that existing tickets expire rather than fail.
  • Use a tested procedure, such as the script Microsoft publishes for this purpose (New-KrbtgtKeys.ps1), which checks replication between the resets.
  • Reset the separate krbtgt_ accounts used by read-only domain controllers in the same way.
  • From then on, change the password at a regular interval set by policy, and promptly after any suspected compromise of the domain or a domain controller, or the departure of an administrator with domain-level rights.
  • If a compromise is suspected, carry out the double reset as part of a wider recovery that first removes the attacker's access, since an attacker who still controls a privileged account can read the new keys.

Confirm the fix by checking that PasswordLastSet shows the recent reset when queried against each domain controller, and that the account's msDS-KeyVersionNumber has increased by two.

References


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