LDAP Signing and Channel Binding Not Enforced

Domain controllers accept LDAP binds without signing, or LDAPS binds without channel binding, so relayed NTLM authentication can be used to change the directory.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1098 Account Manipulation
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Domain controllers do not require LDAP signing (Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements is not set to Require signing), or do not enforce channel binding for LDAP over TLS (Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements is not set to Always). Signing protects the integrity of an LDAP session on port 389, and channel binding ties authentication sent over LDAPS on port 636 to the TLS session that carries it. Without them a domain controller cannot tell whether an NTLM authentication it receives has been relayed by an attacker from a connection made to them, and it also accepts simple binds that send passwords in clear text on port 389.

An attacker who can obtain NTLM authentication from a user or computer, for example through name resolution poisoning or by coercing a workstation's WebDAV client to authenticate over HTTP, can therefore relay it to a domain controller and act in the directory with the victim's rights. Relaying a computer's authentication lets the attacker configure resource-based constrained delegation or shadow credentials on that computer, giving administrative access to it; relaying an administrator's authentication can add accounts to privileged groups or grant replication rights, giving control of the domain. NTLM authentication from SMB clients normally requests signing and cannot be relayed to LDAP in this way, so the attack usually needs an HTTP source, which is reflected in the rating.

The settings can be confirmed by attempting an unsigned NTLM bind on port 389 and an LDAPS bind without channel binding information, for example with NetExec or LdapRelayScan, and, where agreed, by relaying an authentication to the domain controller with ntlmrelayx. On the domain controller, Directory Service event 2887 counts the unsigned and clear-text binds received each day, and event 2889 identifies the clients once LDAP interface diagnostic logging has been raised.

Remediation

  • Set Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements to Require signing in the policy applied to domain controllers (Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options).
  • Set Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements to Always, which corresponds to the LdapEnforceChannelBinding value of 2 under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters.
  • Before enforcing either setting, find the clients that would fail: set the 16 LDAP Interface Events value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics to 2 on each domain controller, review event 2889, and reconfigure those clients to sign, to use LDAPS with channel binding, or to use Kerberos.
  • Keep Network security: LDAP client signing requirements at Negotiate signing or higher on all computers so that Windows clients sign their sessions.
  • Reduce relay sources: disable the WebClient service where WebDAV is not needed, and address name resolution poisoning and authentication coercion.

Confirm the fix by repeating the unsigned bind, the LDAPS bind without channel binding and the relay attempt against every domain controller; each should be rejected.

References


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