Non-Administrative Principals With DCSync Rights

Accounts or groups outside the administrative tier hold directory replication rights, letting whoever controls them extract every password hash in the domain, including krbtgt.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1003.006 DCSync, T1558.001 Golden Ticket
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

Domain controllers replicate directory data, including password hashes and Kerberos keys, through the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR). A principal holding both the Replicating Directory Changes and Replicating Directory Changes All extended rights on the domain object can ask a domain controller to replicate any account's secrets to it, from any host on the network and without running code on the domain controller. Tools such as Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) and Impacket's secretsdump.py do this; the technique is known as DCSync. Whoever controls such a principal can obtain the NT hash and Kerberos keys of every account in the domain, including domain administrators and the krbtgt account.

That gives full and lasting control of the domain: they can authenticate as any user with pass-the-hash and forge golden tickets that survive other password changes, and in a child domain they can use the krbtgt key to claim Enterprise Admins membership and take over the forest. Recovery means resetting every password, including krbtgt twice.

By default only domain controllers and the built-in administrative groups hold these rights. Others are granted them deliberately for products that synchronise passwords, such as the account Microsoft Entra Connect uses for password hash synchronisation, or by mistake through delegation at the domain root. The finding concerns principals outside the administrative tier: ordinary users and groups, service accounts protected less well than a domain administrator, and computer accounts of servers that are not domain controllers. The effort an attacker needs depends on how well the principal is protected: rights held by a broad group are usable by any member, while rights held by one service account first require that account to be compromised, which is often possible where its password is stored on a server or is weak.

The rights are identified from the domain object's permissions, including rights obtained through nested groups, with BloodHound (its DCSync, GetChanges and GetChangesAll edges), PingCastle or dsacls. Where the rules of engagement allow, exploitation can be confirmed by replicating a single low-value account with the principal's credentials.

Remediation

  • Remove the Replicating Directory Changes and Replicating Directory Changes All rights from every principal that is not a domain controller or a built-in administrative group, on the Security tab of the domain object (Advanced Features view in Active Directory Users and Computers) or with dsacls.
  • Where a product genuinely needs them, such as Entra Connect for password hash synchronisation, grant them only to a dedicated account used by that product alone, give it a long random password, and treat the account and the server it runs on as Tier 0, protected like a domain controller.
  • Remove rights left behind by decommissioned products, and check for rights granted through group nesting as well as directly.
  • Detect use of the rights: with auditing of directory service access configured for the domain object, domain controllers log event 4662 for replication requests, and requests using the Replicating Directory Changes All right (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) from accounts other than domain controllers indicate DCSync.
  • If there is any sign that the rights have been misused, treat the domain as compromised and plan a recovery, including a double krbtgt reset.

Confirm the fix by repeating the permissions review and checking that only domain controllers and administrative groups hold the rights; a replication attempt with the former principal should now be refused.

References


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