NTLMv1 or LM Authentication Permitted

Hosts in the domain send or accept LM or NTLMv1 authentication, whose responses can be turned back into the account's NT hash regardless of password strength.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay, T1187 Forced Authentication, T1110.002 Password Cracking
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The Network security: LAN Manager authentication level policy (the LmCompatibilityLevel registry value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa) decides which NTLM response types a computer sends and, on domain controllers, which it accepts. At levels 0 to 2 a computer sends LM or NTLMv1 responses, and domain controllers accept NTLMv1 from clients unless they are set to level 5 (Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM). Legacy devices and applications, and policies lowered years ago for compatibility, are the usual causes.

NTLMv1 builds its response by using the account's NT hash as three DES keys to encrypt the server's challenge. DES keys are small enough to be recovered by brute force, and from precomputed tables where the attacker chooses the challenge and extended session security is not used. An attacker who obtains an NTLMv1 response, by poisoning name resolution on the local network or by coercing a computer to authenticate to them, can therefore recover the NT hash of the account involved whatever the password, and use it to authenticate as that account (pass-the-hash) or crack it to reveal the password. LM responses are weaker still, and NTLMv1 also lacks the message integrity code that NTLMv2 provides, which makes its messages easier to relay to services such as LDAP.

Where servers or domain controllers themselves send NTLMv1, coercing one to authenticate gives the hash of its computer account: for a domain controller this allows every password hash in the domain to be replicated with DCSync, and for a server it allows service tickets to be forged for administrative access to it. Exploitation needs a source of authentication and some effort to recover the hash, but not a weak password.

The weakness is identified from Group Policy and registry settings, from security event 4624 on domain controllers, whose Package Name (NTLM only) field shows NTLM V1 for such sign-ins, and from responses captured during testing, which tools such as Responder label as NTLMv1.

Remediation

  • Set Network security: LAN Manager authentication level to Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM (level 5) on domain controllers and, once compatibility is confirmed, on all servers and workstations. The setting is under Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options. Level 3 on clients is a first step that stops them sending LM and NTLMv1.
  • Before refusing NTLMv1 on domain controllers, identify the clients that still use it from event 4624 records showing NTLM V1, as Microsoft's guidance on auditing NTLMv1 describes, and upgrade, reconfigure or isolate them.
  • Remove any policy that sets a lower level for systems that no longer exist or no longer need it.
  • Reduce NTLM use generally: audit it with the Network security: Restrict NTLM policies, prefer Kerberos, and require SMB and LDAP signing so that relayed authentication is rejected.

The equivalent registry setting is:

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa LmCompatibilityLevel (REG_DWORD) = 5

Confirm the fix by checking the effective setting on domain controllers and a sample of hosts, and by repeating the capture: hosts should no longer send NTLMv1, and domain controllers should refuse it.

References


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