Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Includes Everyone or Anonymous

The Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group includes Everyone or Anonymous Logon, so unauthenticated connections can enumerate domain users, groups and policy.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.15.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
OWASP Top 10A01:2025 Broken Access Control
MITRE ATT&CKT1087.002 Domain Account, T1069.002 Domain Groups, T1201 Password Policy Discovery
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

The built-in Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group exists for compatibility with Windows NT 4.0 systems. Its members are granted read access to user and group objects throughout the domain, and its permissions on the domain object also decide whether a caller can enumerate domain accounts and groups through the Security Account Manager Remote Protocol (SAMR) on a domain controller.

Where the domain was created with permissions compatible with pre-Windows 2000 servers, or an administrator added them later, the group contains Everyone, Anonymous Logon or both. Anonymous Logon covers unauthenticated sessions directly, while Everyone covers them only where Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users is enabled, which has not been the default since Windows Server 2003.

With anonymous access granted this way, an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller can use a null session (an SMB connection with an empty user name and password) to obtain the full list of domain users and groups, group memberships, including the members of privileged groups, and the password and lockout policy. This removes the need for credentials at the start of an attack: the account list and lockout threshold allow password spraying to be tuned to avoid lockouts, and readable attributes such as descriptions sometimes disclose more. The exposure is limited to reading directory information; secret attributes such as password hashes are not readable through this membership.

The membership is visible to any domain user in the Builtin container. Testing confirms the exposure with tools such as rpcclient (enumdomusers), enum4linux-ng or NetExec with empty credentials against each domain controller. A null session that connects but cannot enumerate does not indicate this finding.

Remediation

  • Remove Everyone and Anonymous Logon from the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group in the Builtin container. Keep Authenticated Users as a member unless removing it has been tested, as some applications rely on the read access it gives.
  • Check that Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users is disabled on domain controllers, and consider enabling Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares after testing, as some legacy systems rely on anonymous enumeration.
  • Identify any system that still depends on anonymous access, such as an old network appliance, and give it a dedicated low-privileged account instead; the Windows NT 4.0 systems this membership was designed for are long out of support.

Confirm the fix by repeating the null session enumeration against each domain controller, which should now be refused with an access denied error.

References


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