Privileged Accounts Not in the Protected Users Group
Privileged accounts are not members of Protected Users, so their credentials can be cached on hosts, delegated, and used with NTLM and weaker Kerberos encryption.
| Severity | Low |
| CVSS 3.1 | 1.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 1.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
Protected Users is a global security group, introduced with Windows Server 2012 R2, whose members receive protections that cannot be configured or turned off individually. When a member signs in to a device running Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2 or later, CredSSP and WDigest do not cache their plain-text credentials, NTLM does not keep their NT hash, Kerberos does not create DES or RC4 keys or keep long-term keys after the initial ticket, and no cached verifier is stored, so offline sign-in is not possible. Where the domain functional level is Windows Server 2012 R2 or higher, domain controllers also refuse NTLM authentication for members, refuse DES and RC4 for their Kerberos pre-authentication, will not let their accounts be delegated, and limit their ticket-granting tickets to four hours.
The finding arises when members of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, Schema Admins and other highly privileged groups are not members of Protected Users. The group does not prevent an attack by itself; it limits what an attacker can take from a host they already control. Without membership, when a privileged account signs in to a compromised computer, its NT hash can be extracted and reused for pass-the-hash or cracked long after the session ends, the account can be impersonated through Kerberos delegation, and it can be used with NTLM, where relay attacks apply. The practical effect depends on where privileged accounts sign in: where tiering keeps them off ordinary workstations and servers, the added exposure is small.
The finding is identified by comparing the membership of those groups, including nested members, with that of Protected Users, which any domain user can read.
Remediation
- Add the accounts of people with Tier 0 rights, and other highly privileged human accounts, to Protected Users. Test first with one or two accounts that their tools and sign-in routes still work without NTLM, RC4, delegation and cached sign-in.
- Do not add service accounts or computer accounts: Microsoft advises against it, as the group gives them no local protection and can break the services that use them.
- Keep a documented emergency administrative account outside the group, with its credentials stored securely, in case a configuration problem prevents members from signing in.
- Make sure the domain functional level is Windows Server 2012 R2 or higher, without which the domain controller protections do not apply, and that members' passwords have been changed since the domain reached the Windows Server 2008 level, so that their accounts have AES keys.
- Also set Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated on all privileged accounts.
Confirm the fix by checking the group's membership and, after signing in with a member account, using klist to confirm that its ticket-granting ticket expires four hours after issue.
References
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