Privileged Accounts Used on Workstations (Tiering Not Enforced)

Domain administrators and other highly privileged accounts sign in to workstations and ordinary servers, leaving credentials that an attacker who compromises those hosts can steal.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1550.002 Pass the Hash, T1550.003 Pass the Ticket, T1078.002 Domain Accounts
CategoryInsecure Design

Description

When an account signs in to a Windows host interactively, over Remote Desktop, with RunAs, or as a service or scheduled task, reusable credential material such as its NT hash or Kerberos tickets is held on that host, at least while the session lasts, and anyone with administrative control of the host can extract it. Network sign-ins used by most remote management tools do not leave such material. The tiered administration model addresses this by grouping systems into tiers, with Tier 0 for the identity infrastructure (domain controllers, certificate services, directory synchronisation and similar systems), Tier 1 for servers and applications, and Tier 2 for workstations, and by never letting accounts that control a higher tier sign in to a lower one.

The finding arises when this separation is not in place: members of Domain Admins and other Tier 0 groups use their privileged accounts for everyday work or sign in with them to workstations and member servers, service desk staff use domain administrator rights to support users, or privileged accounts run services and scheduled tasks on ordinary servers. Compromising any workstation or server where a privileged account has signed in, through phishing, an unpatched vulnerability or a reused local administrator password, can then give an attacker that account's credentials and with them control of the domain. This is a common route to domain compromise in internal tests and in real intrusions: it needs no weakness in Active Directory itself, only administrative access to one of the many hosts that privileged credentials pass through. The risk grows with the number of hosts where privileged accounts sign in and the number of staff who hold those rights, and is reduced, though not removed, by Credential Guard, LSA protection and the Protected Users group.

The finding is identified from the sessions of privileged users on workstations and servers (for example with BloodHound's session collection), from privileged credentials recovered from hosts compromised during the test, and from the absence of controls such as authentication policy silos or deny sign-in rights for privileged groups.

Remediation

  • Give administrators separate accounts for each tier they manage, and a standard account for email and web browsing, and use Tier 0 accounts only on Tier 0 systems.
  • Enforce the separation technically: in Group Policy objects linked to workstation and member server organisational units, add Tier 0 groups to the Deny access to this computer from the network, Deny log on as a batch job, Deny log on as a service, Deny log on locally and Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user rights, and use authentication policies and silos to restrict where Tier 0 accounts can sign in.
  • Provide privileged access workstations for Tier 0 administration, and give service desk staff delegated rights over workstations and ordinary users instead of domain administrator rights.
  • Run services and scheduled tasks on ordinary servers with dedicated least-privilege accounts, preferably group managed service accounts, and never with Tier 0 accounts.
  • Where higher-tier staff must connect to lower-tier systems over Remote Desktop, use a lower-tier account, or Restricted Admin mode or Remote Credential Guard, which do not leave reusable credentials on the target.
  • Add privileged users to Protected Users, and enable Credential Guard and LSA protection, as supporting controls.

As an interim measure, reduce the membership of Tier 0 groups, and reset the passwords of privileged accounts after cleaning up the hosts where they were used. Confirm the fix by repeating session collection and by reviewing sign-in events (event 4624) for privileged accounts on systems outside Tier 0.

References


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