Revoked TLS Certificate
The service presents a TLS certificate that its issuing authority has revoked, which clients checking revocation refuse, and which may mean its private key was compromised.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-299: Improper Check for Certificate Revocation |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| Category | Cryptographic Failures |
Description
The certificate presented by the service has been revoked by the certification authority (CA) that issued it: it is listed in the CA's certificate revocation list (CRL) or reported as revoked by its Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder. A CA revokes a certificate when its private key is reported as compromised, when it was issued in error or in breach of the CA's rules, when its owner asks for it to be withdrawn or replaced, or when the details it certifies are no longer correct. Under the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements, publicly trusted CAs must revoke within 24 hours or five days depending on the reason, so a revoked certificate can appear with little warning.
Clients handle revocation inconsistently. Some check it and refuse the connection, which can cause an outage; many check only some certificates, ignore a failure to reach the revocation service, or do not check at all, and continue to accept the certificate. A service can therefore keep working for most users after its certificate has been revoked.
The revocation reason, where the CA publishes one, indicates how serious the finding is. If the private key was compromised, whoever holds that key can impersonate the service to every client that does not check revocation, without any warning, and read or alter their traffic. Where the revocation was routine, for example because the certificate had been replaced, the direct risk is lower, but the service is still presenting a certificate that its CA no longer vouches for.
The issue is shown by testssl.sh, which checks OCSP and CRL status when run with its --phone-out option, by openssl ocsp queries to the CA's responder, and by some vulnerability scanners.
Remediation
Replace the certificate promptly and establish why it was revoked:
- Generate a new key pair, obtain a new certificate for it, and install it, with its chain, on every system that presents the revoked one. Do not reuse the old key.
- Find out the revocation reason from the CA or the certificate's owner. If it was key compromise, treat it as a security incident: identify where the key was stored and how it was exposed, and replace any other certificate that shares the key.
- If the certificate was revoked after being replaced, remove it from the systems that still present it, such as secondary servers, load balancers or disaster recovery sites.
- Include certificate status in monitoring, so that a revocation is noticed promptly.
Confirm the fix by checking that the service presents the new certificate and that its status with the CA is good.
References
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