TLS Certificate Signed Using a Weak Hashing Algorithm

The service's certificate, or one in its chain, is signed using MD5 or SHA-1, hash algorithms broken by collision attacks, which many current clients reject.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-328: Use of Weak Hash
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

A certificate presented by the service, either its own or an intermediate certificate in its chain, carries a signature made with a weak hash algorithm: typically SHA-1 (sha1WithRSAEncryption) or, on very old systems, MD5. Both hash functions are broken by collision attacks. MD5 collisions were used in 2008 to create a rogue CA certificate and later by the Flame malware to forge a code signing certificate; practical SHA-1 collisions were published in 2017 (SHAttered), followed in 2020 by a chosen-prefix collision of the kind needed to forge certificates.

An attacker able to produce a hash collision against a CA that still signs with the weak algorithm could obtain a certificate that appears validly issued for a service they do not control, and use it to intercept that service's traffic without a warning. For SHA-1 this needs a chosen-prefix collision, which is costly and requires the attacker to predict the content of a certificate the CA will sign, so it is beyond most attackers; for MD5 it is far easier.

Publicly trusted CAs stopped issuing SHA-1 certificates years ago, and current browsers and many other clients no longer accept SHA-1 signatures, so the finding is now met mainly on internal CAs that still sign with SHA-1, old self-signed certificates and devices with built-in certificates. In practice the more immediate effect is that those clients reject the certificate, causing warnings that users learn to ignore, or failures that lead administrators to disable verification.

The signature on a root certificate is not a concern, because clients trust a root directly rather than by checking its signature: only the signatures on the server and intermediate certificates matter, and a scanner that flags a SHA-1 root is reporting a false positive. The signature algorithm of each certificate in the chain is shown by testssl.sh, sslscan, openssl x509 -text and vulnerability scanners.

Remediation

Replace any certificate signed with MD5 or SHA-1 by one signed using SHA-256 or stronger (for example sha256WithRSAEncryption or ecdsa-with-SHA256), and correct the issuing CA:

  • Reissue the server certificate, and any intermediate CA certificate signed with a weak hash, then install the new chain on every system that uses it.
  • For an Active Directory Certificate Services CA still signing with SHA-1, change its hash algorithm to SHA-256 after checking that every client and application relying on the CA supports it. For a CA whose key is held by a CNG key storage provider this is done with certutil -setreg ca\csp\CNGHashAlgorithm SHA256 followed by a restart of the Certificate Services service; a CA using a legacy cryptographic service provider must first be migrated to a key storage provider.
  • For devices with built-in certificates, install a certificate issued by a current CA, or apply firmware that supports one.
  • A trusted root certificate does not need to be replaced because of the hash used in its own self-signature.

Confirm the fix by checking the signature algorithm of each certificate the service presents, apart from the root.

References


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