TLS Forward Secrecy Not Supported

The service negotiates key exchanges without forward secrecy, such as static RSA, so anyone who later obtains its private key could decrypt previously recorded sessions.

SeverityLow
CVSS 3.13.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1040 Network Sniffing
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The service does not support, or does not prefer, cipher suites that provide forward secrecy. In suites that use RSA key exchange (named TLS_RSA_WITH_...) the client encrypts the session's secret with the server's long-term RSA public key, and the static Diffie-Hellman suites (TLS_DH_... and TLS_ECDH_...) likewise derive it from a long-term key.

The weakness gives an attacker nothing on its own. It matters if the server's private key is ever exposed, for example through a server compromise, a backup, a memory disclosure flaw such as Heartbleed, or a key shared with other systems: anyone who obtains the key can then decrypt any recorded session that used one of these suites, however long ago it took place. An attacker who has recorded traffic, or who records it until the key is replaced, could therefore read the credentials and data those sessions carried.

Suites using ephemeral key exchange (ECDHE, or DHE) create a fresh key pair for each connection and discard it afterwards, so a later compromise of the server's private key does not expose past sessions. Forward secrecy limits the damage of a key compromise to future traffic, which is why current guidance, such as the OWASP TLS Cheat Sheet, recommends against RSA key exchange. TLS 1.3 provides forward secrecy in every full handshake, because it removed RSA and static Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Forward secrecy is sometimes left out on purpose, because older network monitoring and intrusion detection tools decrypt traffic passively with a copy of the server's private key, which only works with RSA key exchange. Scanners report the issue when no forward secret suite is offered, or when the server's preference order leads common clients to negotiate RSA key exchange; testssl.sh lists the forward secret suites and simulates the key exchange common clients would negotiate.

Remediation

Offer and prefer cipher suites with ephemeral key exchange, and remove RSA and static Diffie-Hellman key exchange where clients allow:

  • Place ECDHE suites with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 at the top of the server's cipher list, and remove the TLS_RSA_WITH_..., TLS_DH_... and TLS_ECDH_... suites once logs show that no required client depends on them. In OpenSSL cipher strings, !kRSA removes RSA key exchange.
  • Enable TLS 1.3, in which every full handshake has forward secrecy.
  • On Windows, reorder or remove the TLS_RSA_ suites through Group Policy (SSL Cipher Suite Order) or with the Disable-TlsCipherSuite cmdlet.
  • Where session tickets are used, rotate the ticket encryption keys frequently or disable tickets, because a long-lived ticket key would allow resumed sessions to be decrypted in the same way.
  • Where a monitoring tool relies on the server's private key, move it to a design that works with forward secrecy, such as inspection at the TLS-terminating proxy, before removing RSA key exchange.

Confirm the fix by rescanning the service and checking that common clients negotiate ECDHE or TLS 1.3 key exchange.

References


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