Wildcard TLS Certificate in Use

The service uses a wildcard certificate, valid for every host name at one level of a domain, so the compromise of any system holding its key affects all of them.

SeverityInformational
CVSS 3.10 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.00 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The service presents a wildcard certificate, one whose Subject Alternative Name contains an entry such as *.example.com that is valid for any host name at that level of the domain. Wildcard certificates are convenient, but the same private key then has to be installed on every server, load balancer or appliance that uses the certificate, often including systems of very different importance and exposure.

This is not a vulnerability in itself and has no direct impact. It is reported because it breaks the principle of least privilege: the key is only as safe as the least protected system holding it. If the key is stolen from any of those systems, an attacker who can intercept traffic could impersonate any host name the certificate covers, including high-value services that never held the key themselves, without causing a warning, and read or alter the traffic of those services.

A shared certificate is also harder to replace quickly after a compromise, because every system using it must be updated, and it makes cross-protocol attacks such as ALPACA more likely to succeed, in which an attacker redirects a victim's TLS connection to a different service, such as a mail or FTP server, that accepts the same certificate. The NSA published guidance on these risks in 2021.

The finding is identified by inspecting the certificate's Subject Alternative Name with a browser, testssl.sh, sslscan or openssl x509 -text; its significance depends on how many systems share the key and how well each is protected.

Remediation

Limit where wildcard certificates are used and how widely their keys are shared:

  • Prefer a separate certificate for each service or group of related services, which automated issuance through ACME makes practical, particularly for high-value services such as identity providers, VPN gateways and payment systems.
  • Where a wildcard certificate is kept, never share it between systems of different trust levels, such as an internet-facing web server and an internal server, and limit its scope by issuing it for a subdomain (for example *.app.example.com) rather than the organisation's main domain.
  • Terminate TLS for the hosts it covers on a reverse proxy or load balancer, so that the key is held on as few systems as possible.
  • Keep a list of every system holding the key, so that all can be updated if it is compromised or expires.
  • Configure services to reject connections whose Server Name Indication or Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation values do not match the service, which defeats ALPACA-style redirection.

Confirm the position by reviewing the certificate inventory and the systems holding each wildcard key.

References


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