ARP Spoofing Not Mitigated
Hosts and switches accept forged ARP replies from any device on the segment, letting an attacker place themselves between other hosts and intercept or alter their traffic.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-300: Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning, T1040 Network Sniffing |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) maps IPv4 addresses to hardware (MAC) addresses on a local network. It has no authentication, and most operating systems accept unsolicited ARP replies that update an existing cache entry. An attacker on the same network segment, without credentials, can therefore send forged replies that associate their own MAC address with the IP address of another host, typically the default gateway, so that traffic meant for it is sent to the attacker, who forwards it on.
Switches can prevent this with Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), which checks ARP packets on untrusted ports against the bindings between ports, MAC addresses and IP addresses that DHCP snooping has recorded, and drops those that do not match. Where these features are not enabled, ARP spoofing succeeds on any segment the attacker can join. The attack is limited to that local segment, which makes the size and contents of each VLAN significant.
Once in that position, the attacker can intercept traffic between other hosts and their gateway or servers and, where it is not protected by encryption, read and change it. Cleartext protocols then expose credentials and data, and the attacker can downgrade weakly configured encryption, inject content or relay authentication; strong encryption, such as TLS with proper certificate validation, limits the attacker to learning which systems communicate. Poorly executed spoofing can also interrupt communication.
The weakness is identified by a controlled ARP spoofing attempt against a test host or a small, agreed set of hosts, with tools such as Bettercap, arpspoof or Ettercap, checking whether the traffic is redirected. It is tested with care, as redirecting a busy gateway's traffic through a laptop can disrupt the network.
Remediation
- Enable DHCP snooping on access switches, trusting only the uplinks and the ports of legitimate DHCP servers, and enable Dynamic ARP Inspection on user VLANs so that ARP packets that do not match the snooping bindings are dropped. Add static bindings or ARP access lists for hosts with fixed addresses.
- Enable IP Source Guard where supported, so that each port can send traffic only from its assigned address.
- Keep user VLANs small and separate from server and management VLANs, so that a spoofing attacker can reach as few systems as possible.
- Encrypt sensitive traffic end to end with TLS, SSH and SMB signing or encryption, so that interception gains little.
- Where switch features are not available, consider static ARP entries for the gateway on critical hosts, and use network detection tools that alert when the MAC address of a gateway changes.
Introduce Dynamic ARP Inspection in stages, as hosts with static addresses need bindings before enforcement. Confirm the fix by repeating the spoofing attempt and checking that the switch drops the forged replies.
References
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