IPv6 DHCPv6 and Router Advertisement Spoofing

Hosts accept IPv6 configuration from any device on the network, so an attacker can make themselves the DNS server for Windows hosts and intercept or relay their authentication.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-300: Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557.003 DHCP Spoofing, T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Windows and most other current operating systems enable IPv6 by default and prefer it to IPv4. On networks that use only IPv4, Windows hosts still send DHCPv6 requests, many hosts listen for IPv6 router advertisements, and nothing legitimate answers either. Neither protocol authenticates the server or router, so any device on the same network segment can reply.

An attacker on the internal network, without credentials, can use tools such as mitm6 to answer the DHCPv6 requests, giving the victim a link-local IPv6 address and the attacker's address as its DNS server, without advertising a route, so the victim's normal IPv4 traffic is unaffected. The attacker's DNS server then answers selected queries, such as those for WPAD or internal host names, with the attacker's own address. Victims that connect, including computer accounts, authenticate, typically with NTLM, and the attacker captures that authentication and relays it with a tool such as ntlmrelayx to services that do not enforce signing or channel binding. Rogue router advertisements, sent with tools such as those in the THC-IPv6 toolkit, can similarly redirect a host's IPv6 traffic through the attacker.

Relaying is most damaging against LDAP on domain controllers that do not enforce LDAP signing and channel binding, where it can let the attacker create computer accounts, configure delegation that lets them take over the relayed computer, or, where a privileged user's authentication is relayed, change permissions in the domain. Depending on other weaknesses, this can lead to compromise of individual hosts or of the whole domain. The attack is limited to the segments the attacker can reach directly, and it fails where relay targets enforce signing and channel binding.

The weakness is identified by observing DHCPv6 solicitations (to UDP port 547) and router solicitations on IPv4-only segments, and confirmed by answering them with mitm6 for a short, agreed period, as the attack changes the victims' DNS settings and can disrupt them.

Remediation

  • Where IPv6 is not used, stop hosts acting on rogue IPv6 configuration. Microsoft advises against disabling IPv6 entirely; instead, use Group Policy to set the predefined Windows Defender Firewall rules Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6-In) and Core Networking - Router Advertisement (ICMPv6-In) to block, and do the same for outbound DHCPv6 requests (Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6-Out)). Disabling IPv6 components with the DisabledComponents registry value also stops the attack, but Microsoft does not recommend it and it must be tested.
  • On the network, enable IPv6 first-hop security on access switches: RA Guard to drop router advertisements from host ports, and DHCPv6 Guard to drop DHCPv6 server messages from host ports. These protect every operating system, including those not managed by Group Policy.
  • Where IPv6 is in use, manage it deliberately with authorised routers and DHCPv6 servers, and apply the same switch protections.
  • Remove the value of relayed authentication: enforce LDAP signing and channel binding on domain controllers, require SMB signing, enable Extended Protection for Authentication on web services, and turn off automatic proxy detection where WPAD is not used.

Confirm the fix by running mitm6 again for a short period and checking that hosts no longer accept its replies or change their DNS server.

References


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