Cleartext Credentials Captured on the Network
Systems send usernames and passwords across the network without encryption, where anyone able to observe the traffic can capture and reuse them.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information |
| OWASP Top 10 | A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1040 Network Sniffing, T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Category | Cryptographic Failures |
Description
Some protocols send credentials in clear text or in a trivially reversible form such as Base64. Common examples on internal networks are Telnet, FTP, HTTP with Basic authentication or plain login forms, LDAP simple binds without TLS, POP3, IMAP and SMTP authentication without TLS, SNMP version 1 and 2c community strings, and the management protocols of printers, building systems and older applications. Database and application protocols are also often configured without encryption.
Anyone in a position to observe this traffic, such as a malicious insider, an attacker with a foothold on a host in the same segment, or anyone able to connect to an unprotected network port, can obtain valid credentials from it without cracking anything, within the limits of their network position and the protocols in use on the segments they can reach. Depending on the accounts involved, the credentials give access to systems, data and network devices, and service and administrative accounts captured in this way often have broad privileges. Because the credentials are valid, their later misuse looks like legitimate activity and is difficult to detect.
During testing, such credentials are captured either passively, from traffic that reaches the tester's network port, such as broadcast and multicast traffic and traffic on shared or mirrored segments, or actively, after redirecting traffic with techniques such as ARP spoofing. Tools such as Wireshark, tcpdump, PCredz and NetworkMiner extract usernames, passwords and community strings from captured traffic. This finding records credentials actually obtained in this way; the configuration of individual cleartext services is often reported separately.
Remediation
- For each protocol on which credentials were captured, move to an encrypted equivalent: SSH instead of Telnet, SFTP or FTPS instead of FTP, HTTPS for every web interface, LDAPS or LDAP with StartTLS instead of simple binds in clear text, IMAPS, POP3S and SMTP with STARTTLS for mail, and SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy instead of community strings.
- Disable the cleartext versions once the encrypted ones are in use, so that clients cannot fall back to them.
- Change every credential that was captured, as it must be treated as known, and review the recent use of those accounts.
- Prefer authentication methods that never send the password, such as Kerberos or certificate-based authentication, and use separate, least-privileged accounts for service connections.
- Reduce exposure while migrating by placing legacy systems on isolated segments, enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection on switches and restricting who can reach the affected services.
Confirm the fix by capturing traffic again from the same network positions and checking that no credentials can be extracted.
References
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