Binaries Not Code-Signed

The application's executables, libraries or installers are not digitally signed, so their origin and integrity cannot be verified by users, Windows or security tools.

SeverityLow
CVSS 3.12.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.01 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-353: Missing Support for Integrity Check
OWASP Top 10A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Some or all of the application's executable files, libraries and installers carry no Authenticode digital signature, or carry a signature that is invalid, or that expired without a timestamp. A signature identifies the publisher and lets Windows, users and security tools confirm that a file has not been altered since it was signed.

Without signatures, a modified or replaced binary looks the same as the genuine one. An attacker who can replace the application's files, or distribute a modified installer, can do so without the change being detectable through signature checks, and users have no reliable way to tell a genuine copy from a tampered one. The absence of signatures does not by itself give access, which is why it is rated low, but it removes a control that would expose tampering.

It also weakens application allowlisting and other safeguards. Windows identifies the publisher as unknown in elevation prompts, which teaches users to accept such warnings; application control policies cannot trust the application by publisher, and must rely on path rules, which trust anything placed in the folder, or hash rules, which break with every release; and security tools have less information to tell legitimate files from tampered ones.

The weakness is identified by checking the signature of each executable, DLL and installer, for example with the PowerShell Get-AuthenticodeSignature cmdlet, Sysinternals sigcheck or signtool verify, or the Digital Signatures tab of each file's properties. Third-party libraries shipped with the application should be checked too.

Remediation

Sign every file the application ships, as part of the build and release process:

  • Obtain a code signing certificate from a trusted certification authority, with its private key generated and held in a hardware security module or a cloud signing service, and restrict who and what can use it.
  • Sign all executables, DLLs, installers and scripts with Authenticode using SHA-256, and timestamp every signature so that it remains valid after the certificate expires. With SignTool, the /fd SHA256, /tr and /td SHA256 options apply a SHA-256 signature and an RFC 3161 timestamp from the certification authority's timestamp server.
  • Ask the suppliers of bundled third-party components for signed versions.
  • Verify signatures in the release pipeline before publishing, and publish the expected publisher name so that users and administrators can check it.
  • Once the application is signed, use publisher rules for it in application control policies, such as App Control for Business or AppLocker.

Confirm the fix by checking the signatures of every file in a new installation.

References


Add This Finding to Your Library

In Pental this write-up is in Settings, Library. Add to my library copies it into your own, rated in your firm's CVSS version, ready to put in your own words.

Free trial  ·  No card required

Only need the reporting? Our reporting tool is free and open source, with the same library.


More Thick Clients Findings

Every Thick Clients finding