CAA Record Not Configured

The domain publishes no CAA record, so every publicly trusted certification authority is permitted to issue TLS certificates for it.

SeverityInformational
CVSS 3.10 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.00 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

CAA records, defined in RFC 8659, let a domain owner name in DNS the certification authorities (CAs) that may issue certificates for the domain and its subdomains. Publicly trusted CAs are required by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements to check CAA records before issuing, and to refuse when they are not named.

When no CAA record applies to a name, any publicly trusted CA may issue a certificate for it, subject to its usual validation. That does not expose anything by itself, but it removes a check that could stop a certificate being issued for the domain by a CA the organisation does not use, for example to an attacker who briefly controls a subdomain's content or DNS, or through a CA's validation error. A certificate obtained that way could support impersonation of the organisation's services or interception of their traffic. Because the attacker must still pass the CA's domain validation, and issued certificates appear in Certificate Transparency logs, the finding is rated informational, as a recommended hardening measure.

The weakness is identified by querying the domain for CAA records (for example dig CAA); a CA looks for a record at the name in the certificate and then at each parent domain in turn, using the first it finds. The issue property controls ordinary certificates, issuewild controls wildcard certificates, and iodef gives an address for reports of refused requests. CAs that support them can also honour parameters that restrict issuance further, such as accounturi and validationmethods, defined in RFC 8657.

Remediation

Publish CAA records naming the CAs the organisation uses:

  • Identify every CA that issues certificates for the domain and its subdomains, including those used by hosting, content delivery and email services on the organisation's behalf, from the certificate inventory and Certificate Transparency logs.
  • Publish CAA records at the organisation's domain with an issue entry for each CA, an issuewild entry if wildcard certificates are needed (or issuewild ";" to forbid them), and an iodef contact, for example:
example.com. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" example.com. CAA 0 issue "digicert.com" example.com. CAA 0 issuewild ";" example.com. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"
  • Where a subdomain uses a different CA, publish CAA records at that subdomain, which take precedence over the parent's.
  • Add the CAA records to the process for changing certificate provider, so that renewals and new requests are not refused.
  • Monitor Certificate Transparency logs for certificates issued for the organisation's domains.

Confirm the fix by querying the CAA records for the domain and its main subdomains, and checking that the CAs named match those in use.

References


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