DNSSEC Not Enabled

The domain's DNS zone is not signed with DNSSEC, so resolvers cannot verify that the answers they receive for it are genuine.

SeverityInformational
CVSS 3.10 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.00 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-353: Missing Support for Integrity Check
OWASP Top 10A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add digital signatures to DNS records. A validating resolver checks each signature against the zone's public key, and that key against a Delegation Signer (DS) record held in the parent zone, building a chain of trust up to the DNS root. Answers that have been forged or altered fail validation and are discarded. When a zone is not signed, or is signed but has no DS record at the parent, resolvers have no way to tell a genuine answer for it from a forged one. A resolver can then be given false answers for the domain by an attacker who can intercept or spoof DNS traffic, or who poisons a resolver's cache, so that users and systems are sent to servers the attacker controls.

Such attacks need a privileged network position or a vulnerable resolver, and for web traffic their effect is largely contained by TLS certificate validation, so the absence of DNSSEC is rated informational, as a recommended hardening measure. It matters more for services that rely on DNS without other authentication, and it is a prerequisite for DANE, which uses DNS to protect email transport. DNSSEC protects the integrity and authenticity of DNS answers, not their confidentiality, and protects users only when their resolvers validate.

The weakness is identified by querying the zone for DNSKEY records and the parent for a DS record, for example with dig +dnssec or delv, or with a DNSSEC analysis tool. Signing is configured with the organisation's DNS hosting provider and domain registrar, many of which support it.

Remediation

Sign the zone and publish its DS record at the parent:

  • Enable DNSSEC signing with the DNS hosting service, many of which, including Amazon Route 53 and Cloudflare, offer managed signing, or on the organisation's own authoritative servers, for example with a dnssec-policy in BIND or zone signing in Windows Server DNS.
  • Publish the DS record for the zone's key signing key through the domain registrar, and check that the chain of trust validates from the root.
  • Use a current algorithm such as ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 (algorithm 13), and plan key rollovers, preferably automated by the provider, since expired signatures or a failed rollover make the domain unresolvable for validating resolvers.
  • Enable DNSSEC validation on the organisation's own recursive resolvers, so that internal users are protected when resolving other signed domains.
  • Once the zone is signed, consider DANE TLSA records for the mail servers.

Confirm the fix with a DNSSEC analysis tool or delv, checking that answers for the zone validate.

References


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