Entra Connect Server Not Protected as Tier 0

The Microsoft Entra Connect server is administered and protected like an ordinary server, although compromising it can lead to control of both Active Directory and the Entra ID tenant.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H Open in the calculator
CWECWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1003.006 DCSync, T1556.007 Hybrid Identity
CategoryInsecure Design

Description

Microsoft Entra Connect Sync synchronises identities from on-premises Active Directory to Microsoft Entra ID. Its server holds credentials for highly privileged accounts: an Active Directory connector account which, when password hash synchronisation is enabled, has the directory replication permissions needed to read every password hash in the domain, and a cloud synchronisation identity that can create and change synchronised users in Entra ID. The credentials are stored encrypted in the synchronisation database, and an administrator of the server can recover them with publicly available tools such as AADInternals. Microsoft therefore advises treating the server as a Tier 0 component, protected to the same standard as domain controllers.

The finding applies where the server is managed like an ordinary member server: its computer object sits in a general server organisational unit, it receives the same Group Policy as other servers, accounts and groups outside Tier 0 are members of its local Administrators or ADSyncAdmins groups, it is administered from ordinary workstations, it runs other software or has unrestricted internet access, or its virtualisation host and backups are managed by staff outside Tier 0. The same applies to staging servers and to servers running pass-through authentication agents.

An attacker who gains administrative access to the server, for example by compromising a server administrator, a backup operator or a management agent that is not held to Tier 0 standards, can then extract the connector credentials. With the Active Directory connector account they can replicate the password hashes of every account in the domain, including the krbtgt account and domain administrators, which amounts to full domain compromise. Through the synchronisation service they can also change synchronised identities in Entra ID, and where pass-through authentication runs on the server they can intercept or bypass cloud sign-ins, so a compromise of the server becomes a compromise of both the on-premises and the cloud identity systems.

The weakness is identified by reviewing the server's local group memberships, organisational unit, linked Group Policy and logon rights, and by attack path analysis with tools such as BloodHound, which show principals outside Tier 0 with administrative paths to it.

Remediation

  • Manage the server as Tier 0: move its computer object to the Tier 0 organisational unit, apply Tier 0 Group Policy, and allow only Tier 0 administrators to sign in to it or administer it, from privileged access workstations.
  • Remove every account and group outside Tier 0 from its local Administrators and ADSyncAdmins groups, and from the permissions on its computer object, its organisational unit and its linked Group Policy objects.
  • Apply the same protection to staging servers, servers running pass-through authentication agents, any remote SQL Server holding the synchronisation database, and the virtualisation hosts, storage and backups that hold any of these machines.
  • Keep the server dedicated to its role: no other applications, no web browsing, outbound internet access restricted to the Microsoft endpoints it needs, Microsoft Entra Connect kept on a current supported version, and prompt operating system patching.
  • Give the Active Directory connector account only the permissions its configured features need, and monitor the server and its accounts closely, for example with Microsoft Defender for Identity, alerting when the connector account is used from any machine other than the synchronisation server.

Where the full tier model will take time, start by removing administrators outside Tier 0 and restricting interactive and remote logon to the server. Confirm the fix by repeating the attack path analysis and finding no route from principals outside Tier 0 to the server.

References


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