Microsoft Entra ID MFA Not Enforced for All Users

Microsoft Entra ID does not require multifactor authentication for every user, so a stolen or guessed password alone is enough to sign in to some accounts.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.09.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-308: Use of Single-factor Authentication
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1110.004 Credential Stuffing
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Multifactor authentication (MFA) for a Microsoft Entra ID tenant is enforced either by security defaults or by Conditional Access policies. The finding applies where neither requires MFA for every user signing in to every resource, so that some accounts can sign in with a password alone. Common causes are security defaults switched off without equivalent Conditional Access policies, policies that target only administrators or selected groups, policies left in report-only mode, broad exclusions for groups, service accounts or trusted network locations, and policies that cover only some applications. Microsoft's mandatory MFA for Azure management and the Microsoft administration portals does not cover users' sign-ins to Microsoft 365 services such as Exchange Online, SharePoint and Teams.

An attacker who obtains the password of an account not covered by MFA, through phishing, password spraying, credential stuffing with passwords leaked from other services, or malware on a user's device, can sign in as that user from anywhere. They can then read and send the user's email, open their OneDrive and SharePoint files and Teams chats, use the account for convincing internal phishing, and set up persistence such as mailbox rules or application consents. Where the account holds an administrative role, the attacker may gain control of the tenant.

A related gap is incomplete registration: where users have not yet registered an MFA method and are allowed to register one at their next sign-in, an attacker who knows the password can register their own method and keep the account. The impact is smaller where only a few low-privileged accounts are uncovered, or where sign-in risk policies and smart lockout disrupt password attacks.

The weakness is identified by reviewing security defaults, the Conditional Access policies and their exclusions, and the sign-in logs, where interactive sign-ins that needed only single-factor authentication show which accounts and applications are not covered. The Conditional Access What If tool, and tools such as MFASweep run with a test account, show which combinations of application, client and location accept a password alone.

Remediation

Require MFA for every user and every resource, with as few exclusions as possible:

  • Where the tenant has Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 licences, create a Conditional Access policy that targets all users and all resources and grants access only with multifactor authentication or, better, an authentication strength. Exclude only the emergency access accounts, and run the policy in report-only mode briefly before turning it on.
  • Where the tenant has no such licences, enable security defaults, which require every user to register for MFA, prompt users for MFA when Microsoft judges it necessary and always prompt administrators.
  • Block legacy authentication, which cannot perform MFA and would otherwise remain a way around the policy.
  • Require phishing-resistant methods, such as FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business or certificate-based authentication, for administrative roles through an authentication strength.
  • Protect MFA registration with a Conditional Access policy on the Register security information user action, for example allowing it only from trusted locations or compliant devices, and use a Temporary Access Pass to onboard new users.
  • Review every exclusion. Replace service accounts that sign in with passwords by managed identities or service principals, and remove trusted-location exclusions.

As an interim measure, enable Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk policies where licensed, and review the sign-in logs for successful single-factor sign-ins. Confirm the fix with the What If tool and by signing in with a test account from an untrusted network, expecting an MFA prompt, then check that the sign-in log shows MFA was required.

References


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