Excessive Global Administrators
More accounts than necessary hold the Global Administrator role, so compromising any one of them gives an attacker full control of the Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 7.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles, T1484.002 Trust Modification |
| Category | Broken Access Control |
Description
Global Administrator is the most privileged role in Microsoft Entra ID. It can manage every aspect of the directory and of the Microsoft services that rely on it, assign any role to any account, and elevate its access to manage all Azure subscriptions and management groups in the tenant, so every account that holds it is a route to complete control of the tenant. Microsoft recommends keeping fewer than five Global Administrators and using less privileged roles for everyday administration.
Tenants frequently hold many more, because the role was given to every member of an IT team, to staff who needed it once, to accounts of former staff or third-party support providers, or to service accounts. Members of role-assignable groups that hold the role, and eligible assignments in Privileged Identity Management, count as well as direct active assignments. Each additional holder increases the chance that one is phished, has a weak password, signs in from a compromised device or is misused by its owner, and an attacker who compromises any one of them can read all mail and files, create accounts and credentials for persistence, change authentication and federation settings, disable security controls and logging, and take control of linked Azure subscriptions.
Related weaknesses often accompany the finding: Global Administrator accounts also used for email and browsing, accounts synchronised from on-premises Active Directory rather than cloud-only, and accounts without phishing-resistant MFA. The likelihood of compromise is reduced, but not removed, where the accounts are cloud-only, protected by phishing-resistant MFA and activated only when needed.
The finding is identified by listing the role's assignments under Roles and administrators in Microsoft Entra ID, or through Microsoft Graph, and comparing each holder's duties with the role's scope.
Remediation
- Reduce the number of Global Administrators to the minimum, fewer than five, including at least two cloud-only emergency access accounts that are kept for break-glass use and monitored for any sign-in.
- Reassign everyone else to the least privileged role for their tasks, such as User Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Exchange Administrator, SharePoint Administrator or Security Reader, using Microsoft's guidance on least privileged roles by task.
- Make the remaining assignments eligible rather than permanent with Privileged Identity Management, requiring MFA, a justification and approval on activation.
- Use dedicated, cloud-only administrative accounts that are not used for email or everyday work, and require phishing-resistant MFA for administrative roles through Conditional Access.
- Review privileged role assignments regularly with access reviews, and alert on new assignments to the role.
Confirm the fix by listing the role's active and eligible assignments again, including group-based assignments, and checking that each remaining holder is justified.
References
Add This Finding to Your Library
In Pental this write-up is in Settings, Library. Add to my library copies it into your own, rated in your firm's CVSS version, ready to put in your own words.
Free trialYour trial starts when your portal goes live, not when you sign up, so the time you spend setting up does not count. · No card required
Only need the reporting? Our reporting tool is free and open source, with the same library.